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In 1945, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of
General Tomoyuki Yamashita, former Commanding General of the Four-
teenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army.' The Court found Yama-
shita had "unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as com-
mander to control the operations of the members of his command," resulting
in the unjustifiable mistreatment and killing of more than twenty-five thou-
sand unarmed civilians.' The Supreme Court stressed that the aim of the hu-
manitarian law of war to "protect civilian populations... from brutality
would largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could with
impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection."3
General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General for the American
Armed Forces in the Far East, earlier affirmed Yamashita's conviction and
death sentence and proclaimed, "the soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged
with the protection of the weak and unarmed."' He admonished that the vio-
lation of this "sacred trust" both "profanes his [the soldier's] entire cult" and
"threatens the very fabric of international society."5 MacArthur proclaimed
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1. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5, 25 (1946).
2. Id. at 14.
3. Id. at 15.
4. COURTNEY WHITNEY, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA: A MEMORANDUM 3 (1950)
(General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Government Section).
5. Id.
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that the "traditions of fighting men are long and honorable" and are based
upon the "noblest of human traits-sacrifice."6 He condemned Yamashita
for having contravened his "soldier faith" and for placing a "blot upon the
military profession" and "a stain upon civilization," whose record stands as
"a memory of shame and dishonor that can never be forgotten."7
As suggested by MacArthur's condemnation, the protection of civilians
is the touchstone of the humanitarian law of war.' The sole object of warfare
is to weaken the enemy's military capacity.' The civilian population, accord-
ingly, shall not be singled out for attack or threats of violence that are in-
tended to spread terror among the civilian population.'" Succinctly stated,
"attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.""
These principles arguably have been honored in the breach." In the
early days of World War I, Kaiser Wilhelm wrote to Austrian Kaiser Franz
Joseph that "everything must be put to fire and sword: men, women and
children and old men must be slaughtered and not a tree or house left stand-
ing."" The Kaiser observed that these "methods of terrorism" would termi-
nate the war in two months, while "considerations of humanity" would un-
necessarily prolong the struggle. 4
The German military manual complained, "the tendency of thought of
the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations
which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emo-
tion."15 These values, according to the manual, were in "fundamental contra-
diction with the nature of war and its object."' 6 The manual prohibited poi-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
9. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp. 1907) (adopted by
the International Military Commission at St. Petersburg).
10. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 51(2), 1977
U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 95, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
11. Id. art. 52(2). Military objectives are "limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, time, in the circumstances ruling at the time, of-
fers a definite military advantage." Id.
12. See generally CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR: A HISTORY OF WARFARE
AGAINST CIVILIANS: WHY IT HAS ALWAYS FAILED AND WHY IT WILL FAIL AGAIN (2002).
13. William Adams, The American Peace Commission and the Punishment of Crimes
Committed During War, 39 L.Q. REV. 245, 248 (1923) (quoting a letter from Kaiser Wilhelm
to Austrian Kaiser Franz Joseph).
14. Id.
15. Hugh H.L. Bellot, War Crimes: Their Prevention and Punishment, II TRANSACTIONS
GROTIUS SOC'Y 31, 41 (1917).
16. Id.
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son, assassination, unnecessary suffering and the refusal of quarter so long
as the "object of war may be attained by milder means." 7
The Preliminary Peace Conference at Versailles appointed a Commis-
sion on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties. 8 The Commission's report of 1919 concluded that despite "ex-
plicit regulations, of established customs, and of the clear dictates of human-
ity, Germany and her allies have piled outrage upon outrage."' 9 This in-
cluded violations of the rights of civilians which "primitive barbarism, aided
by all the resources of modem science, could devise for the execution of a
system of terrorism carefully planned and carried out to the end."2 Belgium
protested the deportation of civilians to Germany for involuntary labor 1 and
noted that it had protested in vain against the "unspeakable suffering in-
flicted on thousands of innocent people" in the camps where they have been
"huddled together, in order that this herd of pitiable human cattle may be
sorted out and enslaved for the ends of despotism."2
The military targeting of civilians continued in World War II. At the
conclusion of the war, nineteen German officials were convicted of various
crimes, including crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg." In discuss-
ing the German General Staff and High Command, the Tribunal noted that
these military men were "responsible in large measure for the miseries and
suffering that have fallen on millions" and had proven to be a "disgrace to
the honorable profession of arms."2 ' Absent the efforts of these military min-
ions, the devilish designs of Hitler and his cohorts "would have been aca-
demic and sterile." 5 They were centrally connected to criminal conduct on a
"scale larger and more shocking than the world has ever had the misfortune
to know."26
The International Military Tribunal argued that these crimes were the
result of the German conception of "total war" 7 that subordinated the ethics
of armed conflict to the exigencies of the military moment. 8 The initial Nazi
17. Id. at 42.
18. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L
L. 95 (1920).
19. Id. at 113.
20. Id.
21. Memoire of the Belgian Government in Regard to the Deportation and Forced Labor
of the Belgian Civil Population Ordered by the German Government, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 99,
111 (Supp. 1917).
22. ld. at 111.
23. See United States v. Hermann Goering, 22 TRLAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
411, 588-89 (1948).
24. Id. at 522.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 523.
27. Id. at 469.
28. Id. at 470.
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military campaigns in Poland and the Soviet Union were characterized by
the murder and mistreatment of civilians." This was "part of a plan to get rid
of whole native populations by expulsion and annihilation, in order that their
territory could be used for colonization by Germans. 30
The Einsatzgruppen, or killing squads, shadowed Nazi troops as the
German army swept through Russia.3 These units were responsible for as
many as two million murders. 2 Those detained in the dock were not safely
sequestered behind desks during the war; they were in the field, actively su-
pervising, controlling and directing this "bloody harvest."33 The defendants
contended that their actions were motivated by self-defense, a claim which
the Tribunal noted would permit a State to abrogate the legal protections af-
forded noncombatants under the humanitarian law of war based on the uni-
lateral claim that the civilians were deemed dangerous. Men, women and
children were summarily executed; it was feared that adolescents who were
permitted to survive would seek revenge in adulthood for the killing of their
parents.35 Millions of people, whose only offense was that they were deemed
to be racial or social inferiors or ideologically suspect, were exterminated.36
Poles opposed to the Reich's occupation policies were tortured, impressed
into involuntary labor and executed.37 The Tribunal in the High Command
case concluded, "[n]o nation, no army, and its leaders of any time, civilized
or uncivilized, labor under so great a load of guilt as do Hitler's Germany, its
army and its leaders in their treatment of these unfortunate people."38
During the Vietnam War, American troops killed as many as 347 non-
combatants at My Lai. 9 In the end, only Lieutenant William Calley was
found guilty of murder and was paroled after serving one-third of his ten-
year sentence, a term of imprisonment which had been set at life by the trial
court but was then drastically reduced by military officials.' Prosecutor Au-
bry Daniels unsuccessfully implored President Richard Nixon to refrain
from interfering with Calley's sentence: "For this nation to condone the acts
of Lieutenant Calley is to make us no better than our enemies and make any
29. Id. at 478.
30. Id. at 480.
31. United States v. Otto Ohlendorf et al., IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 411, 414 (1950).
32. Id. at 412-13.
33. Id. at412.
34. Id. at 462-63.
35. Id. at 415.
36. United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb, Xl TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 462, 495 (1950).
37. Id. at 496.
38. Id. at 495-96.
39. See Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: The My Lai Massacre and the Vietnam War, I
SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 295, 309 (1993).
40. Id. at 318-19. 329.
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pleas by this nation for the humane treatment of our own prisoners meaning-
less.""
In 1992, Serbia launched a campaign to cleanse Bosnia of Muslims
through mass murder, torture, rape, sexual assault, destruction of property
and cultural and religious structures, and attacks on hospitals.42 A United Na-
tions Commission of Experts concluded that this effort to extend the geo-
graphic dominance of the Serbian population was carried out with "extreme
brutality and savagery" in order to instill fear in the civilian population and
cause them to flee.43 The systematic commission and failure to prevent and
to punish these offenses, in the view of the Commission'of Experts, evi-
denced a centralized and coordinated policy of ethnic persecution."
In December 1994, a report by the Commission of Experts on Rwanda
concluded that since April 6, 1994, half a million civilians had been killed
and some reliable estimates had even placed the deaths at close to one mil-
lion.45 The evidence indicated that Hutu violence was carried out in a
planned and systematic fashion and was motivated by ethnic hatred and by a
desire to exterminate the Tutsi. 6
In sum, modern armed conflict has been characterized by a persistent
pattern of targeting civilians. This tactic has taken on an even more deadly
character with the advent of air warfare. This article outlines the position and
plight of civilians subjected to aerial bombardment during World Wars I and
II, the Vietnam War, and the military campaigns in Iraq, Kosovo and Af-
ghanistan, and advocates the explicit international legal regulation of aerial
combat.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE EARLY YEARS OF AERIAL WARFARE
In 1899, the First Hague Peace Conference adopted a Declaration pro-
hibiting the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons and other
instrumentalities. 7 The Contracting Parties agreed to prohibit, for five years,
the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by "other new
41. Id. at 318-19.
42. Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), paras. 133-34, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674 (1994).
43. Id. para. 135.
44. Id. para. 313.
45. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council Transmit-
ting the Final Report of the Commission of Experts, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405, para. 57 (Dec. 9,
1994), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 1993-1996, 415,
421 (1996).
46. Id. para. 58.
47. Declaration Concerning the Prohibition, for the Term of Five Years, of the Launch-
ing of Projectiles and Explosions from Balloons or Other New Methods of a Similar Nature,
29 July 1899, 32 Stat. 1839, reprinted in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS 97 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2000) [Balloon Declaration I].
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methods of a similar nature."" The Declaration was only binding in the
event of a conflict between two Signatory States.49
The instrument was adopted at the plenary session without debate." The
Dutch delegate captured the consensus of the conference when he expressed
uncertainty as to how to proceed in light of the astonishing "progress of sci-
ence" which resulted in the realization of devices "hitherto beyond belief."'"
For instance, he anticipated that the deployment of projectiles containing
"deleterious" devices which, when dropped from balloons, would render en-
emy troops unable to engage in combat." The Declaration was re-opened for
signature in 1907 and was then to remain in force until the Third Peace Con-
ference," which was scheduled for 1915, but never convened. 4 This second
document proved far less significant than the earlier version; France, Spain
and Russia declined to ratify the 1907 instrument and Germany conditioned
its ratification on the acceptance of the Declaration by all parties participat-
ing in the conference.5
Arthur K. Kuhn, writing in 1910, speculated that the acceptance of the
1899 prohibition on the deployment of projectiles from balloons was attrib-
utable to the fact that, at the time, the deployment of aircraft during warfare
remained at an inchoate stage of development. 6 The compromise provision,
which stated that the Convention would only be in effect for five years, fa-
cilitated acceptance by those States anticipating innovations in air warfare.57
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Hamilton DeSaussure, The Laws of Warfare: Are There Any?, 5 INT'L LAW. 527, 530
(1971). The Russian government, in 1899, proposed that the First Hague Conference address
the dropping of projectiles or explosives from balloons. Arthur K. Kuhn, The Beginnings of
an Aerial Law, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 109, 118 (1910).
51. DeSaussure, supra note 50, at 530.
52. Id.
53. Declaration Relative to Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from
Balloons, 18 Oct. 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, reprinted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 47, at 135 [herein-
after Balloon Declaration I1].
54. Detlev F. Vagts, The Hague Conventions and Arms Control, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 31,
35 (2000).
55. DeSaussure, supra note 50, at 530. See George B. Davis, The Launching of Projec-
tiles from Balloons, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 528, 528-29 (1908). Twenty-seven States ratified the
Convention and seventeen States failed to ratify the 1907 instrument, including France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Mexico and Russia. Kuhn, supra note 50, at 119. Great Britain, which de-
clined to ratify the Declaration in 1899, accepted the 1907 instrument. Id. Balloons had been
"employed for more than a century for purposes of observation, signalling, transmission of
dispatches and as a means of escape from besieged" locales. James W. Garner, Aerial Bom-
bardment of Undefended Towns, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 93 (1915). During the attack against
Venice in 1849, the city endured the dispatch of explosives launched from two hundred small
balloons. Id. Balloons also were employed in the siege of Paris in 1870 and were deployed by
the Japanese in the battle of Liao-Yang in 1904. Id. The Germans treated balloonists as war
criminals during the Franco-Prussian War. See Kuhn, supra note 50, at 116.
56. Kuhn, supra note 50, at 119.
57. Id. at 118. All participating nations, with the exception of Great Britain, Italy, Japan
and Luxembourg, ratified the Declaration. Id.
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Twenty-seven States ratified the Hague Convention of 1907, which also was
of limited duration." Kuhn explained this retreat from restraining the scope
of warfare as a product of the States' self-interest in exploiting the develop-
ing and promising technology of air warfare.59 Germany, for instance, had
developed aerial weaponry as well as sophisticated defensive measures by
this time and had little interest in being fettered by legal restrictions. o This
apprehension was not entirely unfounded because the text of the Declaration
broadly applied to the launching of projectiles from balloons or by "other
new methods of a similar nature," phraseology which might be invoked to
limit the future development of air warfare."
There also was language in the Hague Convention of 1907 that may
have potentially limited the scope of air attacks.6' Article 25 provided that
"the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwell-
ings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."63 The language "by
any means whatever" was incorporated .on the initiative of France and, in the
view of some scholars, was meant to apply to aerial bombardments. ' This
prohibition in Article 25, while unlimited in duration, was limited to attacks
against the confusing concept of "undefended" towns and sites.' This pre-
sumably permitted the attack on objects of military import while prohibiting
the direct bombardment of towns bereft of defenses as well as vulnerable
and undefended sites such as hospitals, churches, art galleries, stores and
58. Id. at 119. Two unsuccessful amendments were proposed. Id. at 118-19. A Russian
amendment would have limited attacks against undefended cities. Id. at 119. An Italian pro-
posal would have prohibited the utilization of non-dirigible balloons to deliver projectiles and
explosives. Id. The Italian amendment also would have provided that the restrictions on land
and naval warfare should apply to aerial warfare "wherever compatible with this new method
of combat." Id.
59. Id. at 119.
60. Id. at 120. England, which had declined to ratify the Convention in 1899, now saw
itself as increasingly vulnerable to an attack from the European Continent and ratified the
1907 Convention. Id. at 119-20.
61. Balloon Declaration II, supra note 53. Balloons had been utilized for more than a
century for observation, signaling, transmission of dispatches and escape from besieged loca-
tions. Garner, supra note 55, at 93. In 1849, two hundred balloons filled with explosives were
directed against Vienna. Balloons were utilized in the siege of Paris in 1870 and were de-
ployed by the Japanese during the battle of Liao-Yang in 1904. Id. Airplanes, rather than bal-
loons, were utilized in Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars. Id. See Davis, supra note 55, at 529.
See also James W. Garner, Destruction of Towns and of Institutions Devoted to Religion,
Education, Science and Art, as Punitive Measures, 9 AM. J. INT'LL. 101, 101 (1915).
62. See Hague Convention, supra note 8.
63. Id. art. 25.
64. Gamer, supra note 55, at 96-97. The Convention was signed by all the States repre-
sented at the Conference with the exception of China, Spain and Nicaragua. Id. at 97.
65. Id. at 97. The text does not define the terms "defended" and "undefended." Id. The
presence of troops and barracks is sufficient for a city or town to be considered defended; it is
not necessary that the site be fortified. Id. at 97-98. These sites are subject to attack. A town is
considered defended when means are taken to prevent the entrance of the enemy. Id. at 98. An
undefended city is open to incursion by the enemy. Id.
7
Lippman: Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: Tech
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002
8 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
private residences.66 The means and methods of attacking defended cities
were further qualified by the moral imperative of the Martens Clause in the
preamble, which provided: "inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they re-
sult from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of public conscience."67
James Garner, one of the leading American international lawyers of his
era, critically observed that the clumsy and uncoordinated character of ae-
rial navigation made it "impossible" to limit air bombardment to legitimate
military targets and that, at any rate, bombs inevitably would damage homes,
hospitals, churches and parks. 9 Gamer, therefore, comfortably and confi-
dently condemned indiscriminate attacks on locales far removed from the
frontlines as "contrary to the generally accepted notions of civilized war-
fare."7
The intent to prohibit the aerial attack of undefended cities was further
clarified by the report of the American delegation accompanying the Hague
Convention of 1907 regulating naval bombardment which, in Article 1, pro-
hibited the bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, vil-
lages, dwellings or buildings.7 The American delegation noted in its report
that the latter article "brings the rules of land and naval warfare into exact
harmony. '"72
In 1911, the Institute of International Law, meeting in Madrid, debated
whether aircraft may be utilized during armed conflict and whether limita-
66. Id. at 98-101. See Hague Convention, supra note 8, art. 27. This requires that in
"sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible,
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hos-
pitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used
at the time for military purposes." Id. The Hague Convention also prohibits the destruction or
seizure of "the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war." Id. art. 23(g). The employment of arms "calculated to cause unnec-
essary suffering" also is impermissible. Id. art. 23(e).
67. Hague Convention, supra note 8, at pmbl. The fact that aviators acted within the let-
ter of the law would not mean that they were in conformity with the natural law impulse un-
derlying the Martens Clause. This, for instance, presumably would prohibit attacks which
foreseeably may cause collateral damage to civilians and to civilian objects. See Garner, su-
pra note 55, at 100. Article 53 of the Hague Convention was the first effort to combine stric-
tures on land, sea or air warfare in requiring that compensation be paid to private individuals
following the conclusion of hostilities for the seizure of goods seized on "land, at sea, or in
the air." See Hague Convention, supra note 8, art. 53.
68. Matthew Lippman, The Prosecution of Josef Altstoetter et al.: Law, Lawyers, and
Justice in the Third Reich, 16 DICK. J. INT'LL. 343, 363 n.198 (1998).
69. Garner, supra note 55, at 101.
70. Id.
71. Kuhn, supra note 50, at 121 (discussing Convention Concerning Bombardments by
Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2351).
72. Quoted in id. Geoffrey Best argues that it would be "perverse" to assume that the
Hague peace conference did not intend to extend the principles pertaining to land and naval
war to aerial attacks. See GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 263 (1980).
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tions should be placed upon their deployment." Some favored the prohibi-
tion on the employment of airplanes during hostilities and pointed to the ex-
pense already associated with maintaining a military; others advocated limit-
ing the utilization of projectiles; while a third group argued that aircraft
should be authorized to respond in self-defense." The Institute concluded ae-
rial warfare should be permitted on the condition that no greater danger is
created for those not engaged in conflict than in the case of land or naval
conflict." There was a strong strain of educated opinion that viewed this po-
sition as unnecessarily limiting, and argued that air war was a cost-effective
and potentially powerful weapon, transforming the resort to war into an anti-
quarian curiosity."
In 1915, the Germans launched zeppelins against British cities." The
crude technology of aerial artillery attacks limited Germany's ability to tar-
get specific objectives and the aerial campaign was largely irrelevant to the
outcome of World War .7' Still, 208 British civilians were killed by German
bombing in 1915, terrorizing the population and undermining morale. " The
Germans rationalized that these unprecedented urban aerial raids on civilians
constituted permissible acts of reprisal for the British naval blockade of
Germany, which allegedly resulted in the starvation and death of innocents."
The Allied Powers, rather than contesting the legality of the German attacks,
retaliated by bombing cities in the Reich."
II. THE HAGUE RULES OF AERIAL WARFARE
The Conference on the Limitation of Armament, meeting between No-
vember 12, 1921 and February 6, 1922, formed a Committee on Limitation
of Armament, which determined that it was unrealistic to impose limitations
on the number or characteristics of aircraft that may be deployed by a single
State. 2 The committee further opined that the employment of aircraft in
73. Blewett Lee, Sovereignty of the Air, 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 478-79 (1913).
74. Id. at 479.
75. Id.
76. Kuhn, supra note 50, at 132.
77. JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF
PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 16 (1982).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. These attacks escalated in 1917 and, aggregated, some nine thousand German
bombs weighing two hundred eighty tons were delivered by fifty-one Zeppelin and fifty-two
Gotha raids against Great Britain. Id. 1,413 were killed and 3,408 were wounded in these
raids. ROBERT A. PAPE, BOMBING TO WIN: AIR POWER AND COERCION IN WAR 59 (1996).
81. WILLIS, supra note 77, at 16. The first deployment of a Zeppelin against a city was,
in August 1914, when the Germans launched an attack on Liege in Belgium in retaliation for
the city's refusal to surrender. BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 176 (1962).
Thirteen bombs were dropped and nine civilians were killed. Id. Barbara W. Tuchman writes
that this "inaugurated a twentieth century practice." Id.
82. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 790 (1922) (18th Mtg.).
9
Lippman: Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: Tech
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002
10 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
armed conflict should be governed by the rules of land warfare as adapted to
the characteristics of aerial attacks by a conference to be held at a later date.83
The chair of the committee, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes of the
United States, cautioned that it was futile to attempt to limit the technologi-
cal development of aircraft, which promised to be "the most formidable mili-
tary weapon of the future." 4
A subcommittee report reiterated the utilization of aircraft should be
covered by the rules of warfare as tailored to the characteristics of aerial
warfare." Carlo Schanzer of Italy introduced a resolution recognizing that
the bombardment of undefended towns, villages, dwellings and buildings by
aircraft was prohibited under international law and was binding on all civi-
lized nations."' The French Delegation endorsed these sentiments, but
stressed that Article 25 of the Hague Convention of 1907 already prohibited
the attack or- bombardment of undefended towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings.87 However, Elihu Root of the United States contended that clarifi-
cation of this rule as applied to air warfare was required because fortified
towns generally were not equipped to rebuff aerial attacks.88 He suggested
that the relevant distinction was the military value of a site; a railroad junc-
tion or munitions factory might be bombed while a population center should
be immune from attack.89 Sir Robert Borden of Canada objected to proposals
for legal regulation that must consider railroad junctions and munitions fac-
tories because clusters of innocent civilians typically surrounded such sites."
Senator Schazner did not insist on bringing his resolution to a vote and
expressed satisfaction that the committee recognized the issues raised by air
warfare.9 Chairperson Hughes' proposal was unanimously adopted to create
a drafting subcommittee to consider the legal rules required to regulate aerial
warfare.9" The committee, comprised of representatives of the United States,
Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, was to evaluate whether the existing
rules of international law adequately covered the new methods of aerial at-
tack introduced since 1907 and, if not, what modifications in the existing
rules were required.93
83. Id.
84. Id. at 796.
85. Id. at 800. An advisory committee to the American delegation specified that the at-
tack on "towns, villages, dwellings or buildings that are undefended is prohibited. The bom-
bardment of fortified places or of munition factories is legitimate, but cities and towns, unless
defended, should be spared, and every safeguard should be invoked to protect noncombatants
against attack from the air." Id.
86. Id. at 802.
87. Id. (statement by Admiral De Bon).
88. Id. at 804.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 806.
91. Id. at 804-06.
92. Id. at 808, 812.
93. Id. at 814 (19th Mtg.).
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This resulted in the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, which, while
failing to attract sufficient support to assume a legally binding status and
stature, has been recognized as generally embodying customary international
law." The commission worked from drafts submitted by the United States
and Great Britain.95 It noted that the Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons of 1907 was sufficiently broad to
include aerial bombing.96 This document, however, was limited in duration
and only applied to conflicts between States Parties.97 The number of signa-
tories to the 1907 Declaration was also sufficiently modest such that the in-
strument could only have limited impact.98 The commission thus concluded a
more general declaration was required.9
The commission noted the horror evoked during World War I over the
indiscriminate bombing of noncombatant populations who were not in the
theater of military operations." This helped to create a universal consensus
that limitations must be imposed on aerial attacks.' Then again, States were
unlikely to confine their freedom of action and limit the military deployment
of this new air technology. 2 The best that could be hoped for was to agree
on legitimate objects of attack, yet it was precisely this area on which it was
most difficult to reach a consensus. 3
In the end, a measure of agreement was reached."' Article 22 of the
Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare prohibited aerial bombardment for "the pur-
pose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private
property not of a military character, or of injuring noncombatants.""' 5 Article
24 specified that an aerial bombardment was legitimate only when directed
exclusively at a military objective, a target whose "destruction or injury
would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent.""'6 A limited
number of legitimate targets were specified: military forces, works, estab-
94. Rules of Aerial Warfare (1923), contained in Commission of Jurists to Consider and
Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of Warfare, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (Supp. 1938)
[hereinafter Aerial Warfare]. The Air Force military manual states that although the Hague
Rules "have some authority because eminent jurists prepared them, they do not represent ex-
isting customary law as a total code." DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS (AF PAMPHLET 110-31,
Nov. 19 1976), 5-3 [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE] (emphasis omitted).
95. Aerial Warfare, supra note 94, at 12.
96. Id. at 22 (Bombardment) (citing Balloon Declaration II, supra note 53).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 22-23.
99. Id. at 23.





105. Id. art. 22. Aerial bombardment may not be utilized to enforce compliance with
requisitions or payment of contributions of money required by the armed forces. Id. art. 23.
106. Id. art. 24(1).
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lishments and depots; factories manufacturing arms, ammunition or distinc-
tive military supplies; and communications or transportation utilized for
military purposes. 7 Aircraft were to abstain from attack in those instances in
which these sites could not be targeted without the indiscriminate bombard-
ment of the civilian population." 8
Attacks on cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings were legitimate
in the immediate area of the operations of land forces provided that there ex-
isted a "reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently
important to justify such bombardment, having regard to the danger thus
caused to the civilian population."1 9
Article 25 provided that all necessary steps must be taken to avoid at-
tacking, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, medi-
cine and structures of historic significance. '° Further protections were set
forth in Article 26, which established zones of protection around historic
monuments enjoying immunity from aerial bombardment."' These were not
to exceed five hundred meters in width.1
2
The international community was torn over the military prospects and
perils of aerial bombardment. The Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare evidenced
a general movement to constrain the calamitous consequences of aerial
bombardment. The uncertain stance of the international community is re-
flected in the fact that the instrument failed to receive ratification. However,
the central provisions of the instrument are recognized as a component of
customary law."3
III. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
The principles articulated in the Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare were
invoked by the League of Nations in denouncing the aerial bombardments of
China and Spain in the 1930s."' In 1937, Japanese forces invaded Central
and North China.' The Chinese alleged that the Japanese bombed Red
107. Id. art. 24(2).
108. Id. art. 24(3). "The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings
not in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited." Id. art.
24(3).
109. Id. art. 24(4). "A belligerent state is liable to pay compensation for injuries to per-
sons or to property caused by the violation" of the provisions of Article 24. Id. art. 24(5).
110. Id. art. 25. Essential steps must be taken by the commander to avoid buildings dedi-
cated to "public worship, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospital
ships, hospitals and other places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided such
buildings, objects or places are not at the time used for military purposes." Id. art. 25. Such
buildings must be designated by marks visible in day and night to aircraft. Id. art. 25.
111. Id. art. 26(1).
112. Id. art. 26(3).
113. See supra notes 94-112 and accompanying texts.
114. See PAPE, supra note 80, at 336-38.
115. See Communication, dated August 30, 1937, from the Chinese Government to the
Secretary-General (C.342.M.232.1937.VI1), 18 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 653, 655 (1937).
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Cross vans and hospitals and pointed to a number of attacks against civil-
ians, including the killing of two hundred and wounding of five hundred in
Shanghai. 16 A significant number of the victims were women, children and
refugees waiting to be transported to safety." 7 In 1937, the League con-
demned the Japanese aerial bombing of undefended Chinese cities, which
resulted in the inexcusable killing of hundreds of innocent civilians."8 The
United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, forwarded a communiqu6 to
the General Assembly following the vote in which he proclaimed, "any gen-
eral bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace en-
gaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to the principles of
law and of humanity.""' 9
In June 1938, the Cuban delegate protested to the Assembly of the
League of Nations the bombing of open and unprotected towns in Spain and
the resulting slaughter of the elderly, women and children."' Cuba called for
"4universal reprobation" of these acts, which it characterized as "the deeds of
uncivilised people dominated by primitive tribal passions.'' In August
1938, the Spanish government placed on the League of Nations agenda the
question of the protection of civilian noncombatant populations against ae-
rial bombing."' The importance of this request was emphasized by a Com-
mission of Investigation constituted by the United Kingdom, which deter-
mined that non-military targets were intentionally targeted in Spain.'23 The
Spanish delegate, Mr. Pablo de Azcdrate, noted that over one thousand air
attacks had been directed at civilian populations involving twenty-four thou-
sand bombs, seven thousand civilian dead, eleven thousand wounded and ten
thousand buildings partially or totally destroyed."'
The Third Committee of the League of Nations reported popular opin-
ion had consistently expressed its horror over the bombing of civilians that
typically does not serve a military purpose and merely causes unnecessary
suffering.'" The Committee concluded that the prohibition on the bombing
116. Communication, dated September 12, 1937, from the Chinese Government to the
Secretary-General (C.376.M.253.1937.VII); id. at 655, 656-57.
117. Id. at 657.
118. Records of the 18th Ordinary Session of the League Assembly, Plenary Meetings,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 169, at 83, 90 (9th Plenary Mtg., Sept. 28, 1937).
119. Id. at 91 (10th Plenary Mtg., Sept. 30, 1937).
120. Letter, dated June 2, 1938, from the Permanent Delegate of Cuba to the Secretary-
General (C.210.M.116.1938.IX), 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 880 (1938) [hereinafter
LEAGUE OF NATIONS].
121. Id.
122. Telegram, dated August 10, 1938, from the Spanish Government to the Secretary-
General; id.
123. Protection of Civilian Populations against Bombing from the Air in Case of War,
Resolution of the League of Nations Assembly, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 182, at
16 (1938) [hereinafter Protection of Civilian Populations].
124. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 120, at 18 (Third Committee, 3rd Plenary Mtg.,
Sept. 17, 1938).
125. Protection of Civilian Populations, supra note 123, at 15.
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of civilians was a recognized and established principle of international law
and its affirmation would merely reiterate a rule that governments were
bound to respect. 26 The challenge remained to establish a comprehensive set
of regulations tailored to air war, which took the lessons of experience into
account.27
The General Assembly, on September 30, 1938, endorsed the Third
Committee's draft resolution and recommendation.'28 The resolution noted
that three principles provided the basis for any subsequent regulation of air
war. 29 These were the prohibition on intentionally bombing civilian popula-
tions, the limitation on targets of attack to military objectives and the avoid-
ance of the negligent bombing of civilian populations.3 The Assembly also
recommended that the League Council conduct a study of wanton and reck-
less aerial attacks.' 3'
The Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare' 32 and the League of Nations' 3  pro-
claimed that aerial bombing was to be carried out in a discriminate fashion.
This was a retreat from the philosophy articulated in the 1920s and 1930s by
the so-called "prophets" of aerial warfare: Guilio Douhet of Italy, Hugh
Trenchard of Great Britain and Billy Mitchell of the United States, all of
whom argued that the airplane had revolutionized warfare by eliminating the
distinction between combatants and noncombatants. 3' These military men
argued that attacks on civilians and on the urban infrastructure inevitably
would lower morale and create social disorder, leading to popular agitation
for the termination of an armed conflict.33 This psychological penetration,
rather than material devastation, was the central and crucial component of
this new city busting strategy.' Aerial bombing would not only lead to a
quick resolution of armed conflicts, but would also be more humane in that
aerial acrobatics would come to overshadow and overtake the trials, tribula-
tions and terror of trench warfare.'37
126. Id.
127. id.
128. Id. at 15-17.
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 16-17.
132. Aerial Warfare, supra note 94, at 23-26.
133. See supra notes 114-31 and accompanying texts.
134. See ERIC MARKUSEN & DAVID KOPF, THE HOLOCAUST AND STRATEGIC BOMBING:
GENOCIDE AND TOTAL WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 201-02 (1995).
135. See PAPE, supra note 80, at 60. Trenchard believed the firm British character and
capacity to absorb attacks would permit the English to persevere over more psychologically
precarious foes. Id. at 60-61.
136. See id. at 61.
137. See MARKUSEN & KOPF, supra note 134, at 202. The United States adopted an in-
dustrial web strategy that targeted the central components of the urban economy in order to
cause chaos. PAPE, supra note 80, at 62-63. The enemy population would be starved rather
than incinerated. Id.
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2002], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss1/2
2002] AERIAL ATTACKS AND THE HUMANITARIAN LAW OF WAR 15
In the end, the militaristic motives and imperatives of World War II
overwhelmed inchoate efforts to restrain the employment of air power.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF AERIAL WARFARE DURING WORLD WAR II
A. Germany
Immediately following Hitler's invasion of Poland in September 1939,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt urged Great Britain, France and Ger-
many to publicly pledge to refrain from the aerial targeting of urban areas.'
Two weeks later, in the House of Commons, English Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain vowed to avoid intentional attacks on "women and children
and other civilians for purposes of mere terrorism."'3 Belligerents generally
adhered to this policy and practiced a measure of self-restraint: Great Brit-
ain, for instance, instructed pilots to jettison excess bombs when weather
conditions interfered with target identification, avoid population centers and
limit attacks to daylight precision bombing."
This mutual restraint was breached on September 17, 1939, when the
German air force (Luftwaffe) reduced Warsaw to rubble."' The Luftwaffe
coordinated this urban bombing with the blitzkrieg attack by German ground
forces which, in combination, resulted in the rapid surrender of Poland
within two weeks."2 On October 16, 1939, Great Britain responded by re-
treating from the regime of aerial restraint.1"3
The air war spiraled out of control. On May 14, 1940, Germany
launched a substantial strike against Rotterdam in Holland.'" Great Britain
undertook a night mission against several cities in the industrial Ruhr region,
which resulted in significant damage to residential areas.44 A month later,
138. MARKUSEN & KOPF, supra note 134, at 151.
139. Quoted in id.
140. Id. at 152.
141. Id. at 152-53.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 153. There were three approaches to bombing. The industrial web theory tar-
geted central economic sites, primarily electric power grids, in an effort to create fiscal col-
lapse and to undermine morale. PAPE, supra note 80, at 62-63. By 1943, United States strat-
egy shifted to the strategic interdiction of those portions of the economy directly linked to the
military power of the Wehrmacht. Id. at 262-63. This centered on the attack against the facili-
ties manufacturing ball bearings. Id. at 263-64. The third strategic approach involved direct
attacks on German population centers. Id. at 260. This was adopted as the central British
strategy and later was incorporated as part of the American strategic plan. Id. at 260-62. The
goal was to render enemy territory uninhabitable and to intimidate and frighten the popula-
tion. Id. at 260-61.
144. MARKUSEN & KOPF, supra note 134, at 153. Reports recorded thirty thousand dead;
the actual number may have been roughly one thousand. Id. This was perceived as an inten-
tional attack, but German officials appear to have made an effort to terminate the mission. Id.
145. Id.
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Germany launched the Battle of Britain, an air offensive against England. '46
The combination of night bombing and the targeting of military facilities
within London resulted in severe damage to the central city."7 England re-
taliated with an attack on industrial sites in Berlin.' Hitler launched a nine-
month air campaign against civilian targets within London; by mid-May
1941, the death toll stood at forty-five thousand with more than 3.5 million
homes destroyed or seriously damaged.' 9
On October 1940, the British shifted from "precision" bombing to
"area" or "saturation" bombing, which indiscriminately deployed high ex-
plosives and incendiary weapons against German industrial and military in-
stallations situated within densely populated residential areas.' ° The result-
ing fires were fueled by continued aerial sorties, which prevented fire
fighters from dousing the flames.' On November 14, 1940, the Germans re-
taliated by attacking Coventry in England, leaving five hundred dead and de-
stroying twenty thousand homes.5 '
The British grew increasingly frustrated over the loss of aircraft and
failure to erode German determination and discipline.'53 They shifted to di-
rect attacks on civilian workers in an effort to undermine morale and impede
war production.'54 This policy was spearheaded by Arthur Harris, an un-
apologetic advocate of attacking noncombatants, who was appointed to di-
rect the Bomber Command.'55 A relentless series of air raids by American
and British forces were then initiated.'56 In March 1942, the town of Ltibeck
and its wooden architecture were ignited by three hundred tons of bombs re-
leased by 234 bombers.'57 The Luftwaffe retaliated by targeting the militarily
marginal sites of Oxford and Exeter."'
On May 30, 1942, Harris launched one thousand bombers against Co-
logne; one thousand four hundred tons of bombs were dropped, resulting in
the razing of six hundred acres.'59 Between March and July 1943, forty-three
raids were directed against manufacturing sites in the Ruhr region, in addi-
146. Id.
147. Id. at 154.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 155.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 156.
154. Id.
155. See generally HENRY PROBERT, BOMBER HARRIS: His LIFE AND TIMES: THE
BIOGRAPHY OF MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AmR FORCE SIR ARTHUR HARRIS, THE WARTIME CHIEF
OF BOMBER COMMAND (2001).
156. See MARKUSEN & KOPF, supra note 134, at 157-63. The Americans continued to
adhere to precision bombing and attacked during the day. The British attacked at night. Id. at
157-58.
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tion to the attacks against Berlin.'60 In July 1943, the British and Americans
launched Operation Gomorrah, which was designed to destroy Hamburg. 6'
The city was engulfed in a mass of flames, heat and smoke, which resulted
in the death of forty-five thousand civilians62 and the destruction of thirteen
square city miles in two days of bombing. 63 Markusen and Kopf recount that
people were "turned into human torches by the intense heat," babies were
"torn by the high winds from their mothers' arms and sucked into the
flames," and rescuers entering homes found "bones suspended in congealed
f a t . , 
,11 6
Sixteen major bombing raids against Berlin followed between Novem-
ber 1943 and March 1944."6 The Germans retaliated with five thousand V-1
buzz bombs and V-2 missile attacks against Great Britain, which resulted in
the death of several thousand. 166 This air campaign culminated in the Febru-
ary 1945 attack on Dresden in eastern Germany. 67 Estimates are that, follow-
ing fourteen hours of bombing, the death toll numbered between seventy
thousand and one hundred and thirty-five thousand.
61
As the war drew to a close, the Americans reconsidered their plan to en-
gage only in precision bombing and adopted the British model of targeting
civilians.'69 In August 1944, President Roosevelt proclaimed that the Allied
Powers must "castrate the German people" in order to prevent the perpetua-
tion of Nazism. 7 In February 1945, over nine hundred United States bomb-
ers struck Berlin, killing as many as twenty-five thousand; ten days later the
Americans joined the British in bombing Dresden.'7
B. Japan
Various American study commissions advised that incendiary bomb at-
tacks against Japan's highly flimsy and inflammable urban architecture
would set the country's cities ablaze and cripple the economy.' General
Curtis LeMay abandoned all pretense of precision bombing and directed
American pilots to fire-bomb residential areas.' On March 9, 1945, the
160. Id. at 158.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 158-59.
163. Id. at 160.
164. Id. at 159.
165. Id. at 160.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 161.
168. Id. at 162.
169. Id. at 167.
170. Quoted in id. at 168.
171. Id. at 168.
172. Id. at 173-75.
173. Id. at 175.
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Americans launched a low-altitude bombing raid against Tokyo.'74 The resi-
dential area targeted for attack housed numerous small-scale manufacturing
facilities.'75 Over three hundred planes dropped roughly two thousand tons of
bombs at a target area of three miles by four miles, which housed roughly
1.25 million people.'76 The temperature emitted from the firestorm exceeded
one thousand eight hundred degrees Fahrenheit.'" The canals boiled and
houses and individuals spontaneously burst into flames.'8 The stench of
burning flesh filled the skies two miles above the city.'79 The United States
Strategic Bombing Survey set the death toll from the six-hour raid at 87,793
with 40,918 injuries;'80 sixteen square miles of the city were reduced to rub-
ble in what is considered the "most devastating air attack in history."'8 ' Be-
tween March 11 and March 19, a series of raids against Nagoya, Osaka and
Kobe destroyed an additional sixteen square miles of some of Japan's most
significant cities.'82 Between May and August, fire-bombing destroyed fifty-
eight cities and virtually every sizable town had been incinerated.'83
In the end, 178 square miles were destroyed, comprising forty percent of
the urban areas of the sixty-six cities attacked; twenty-two million people,
thirty percent of Japan's entire population, were left without homes;'84 and
nine hundred thousand civilians were dead.85 In June 1945, General Bonner
Fellers sent a confidential memo to General Douglas MacArthur describing
the fire-bomb raids as "one of the most ruthless and barbaric killings of non-
combatants in all history.' 86
This, of course, was a prelude to dropping atomic bombs on August 6,
1945 and August 9, 1945. ' As many as one hundred and forty thousand
people were killed immediately at Hiroshima, and seventy thousand were
174. Id. at 175-78.
175. Id. at 176.
176. Id. at 178.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 178-79.
179. Id. at 179.
180. Id.
181. PAPE, supra note 80, at 103.
182. Id.
183. MARKUSEN & KOPF, supra note 134, at 180. Secretary of War Henry Stimson ex-
empted Kyoto due to its religious significance. Id. As the incendiary-bombing campaign con-
tinued, smaller locales were added to the target list and, by July 1945, cities with populations
of one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand were subject to attack. Id.
184. PAPE, supra note 80, at 104.
185. Id. Japan's combat casualties were approximately seven hundred and eighty thou-
sand. Id. Sixty-four cities were the target of saturation bombing; an average of forty percent
of each site was destroyed, over two-thirds of civilians experienced air raids, and more than
one-third lived in neighborhoods which were bombed. Id. Japanese civilians suffered nine
hundred thousand deaths (1.2 percent of the population) as compared to three hundred and
thirty thousand Germans (0.5 percent of the population). Id. at 129. Sixty-seven percent of
those subjected to bombing reported "intense fright and fear of death." ld. at 130.
186. ROBERT B. EDGERTON, WARRIORS OF THE RISING SUN 317 (1997).
187. MARKUSEN & KOPF, supra note 134, at 180.
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killed at Nagasaki. 8' Thousands of others died as a result of the delayed ef-
fects of radiation.'89 Admiral William Leahy, President Harry Truman's
Chief of Staff, would write in his postwar memoirs that as the first country
to deploy the atomic bomb, the United States "adopted an ethical standard
common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."''"
V. NUREMBERG
The text of the Nuremberg Charter seemingly invited examination of the
legality of German aerial tactics.'' The war crimes provision, for instance,
encompassed the "wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devasta-
tion not justified by military necessity."'92 Indiscriminate air attacks against
urban areas also might be included within the prohibition under crimes
against humanity as "inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
tion."'93 The Nuremberg Tribunal noted that the war crimes article merely
reflected the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 which, by 1939,
had been recognized as binding customary law by all civilized nations.'94
Those inhumane acts charged in the indictment committed in execution of,
or in connection with, Germany's wars of aggression that did not constitute
war crimes were deemed by the Tribunal to constitute crimes against human-
ity.' In commenting upon the German General Staff and High Command,
which included the leadership of the Air Force, the Tribunal noted that these
officers were responsible for the "miseries and suffering that have fallen on
millions of men, women, and children."' 96 The conduct of these commanders
disgraced "the honorable profession of arms."'97 Absent their support, Hit-
ler's ambitions and aspirations would have remained "academic and ster-
ile."' 98 The Tribunal, however, failed to provide a detailed discussion of the
international legality of Germany's aerial war campaign.Y9 In discussing
Hermann Goering, the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, the Court did
188. Id. at 182.
189. Id.
190. Quoted in id. at 251.
191. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945,
59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
192. Id. art. 6(b).
193. Id. art. 6(c).
194. See United States v. Hermann Goering, 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
411,497 (1948).
195. Id. at 498.
196. Id. at 522.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See generally id.
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make reference to Germany's indiscriminate aerial attacks on Poland and
other victims of the Reich's wars of aggression.Y
The decision to refrain from prosecuting those who ordered, organized
or carried out aerial attacks violative of the Nuremberg Charter likely re-
flected the fact that both Germany and the Allies engaged in similar tac-
tics.2"' The Tribunal, for instance, declined to deliberate on the charge that
Admiral Karl Doenitz waged unrestricted submarine warfare and explained
that both the United Kingdom and the United States pursued identical poli-
cies."' A similar rationale was invoked in acquitting Doenitz's successor,
Admiral Paul Raeder, who was charged with sinking unarmed merchant and
neutral ships as well as with the non-rescue and machine-gunning of survi-
vors. 203
Brigadier General Telford Taylor, Chief United States Counsel for War
Crimes, wrote in his Final Report to the Secretary of the Army that belliger-
ents on both sides generally disregarded rules regulating military combat and
that, as a result, in drafting the Nuremberg indictment this criminal category
proved relatively unimportant." He noted that while the Germans bombed
Warsaw, Rotterdam, Belgrade and London, the Allies attacked German and
Japanese cities."' This "deliberate policy" was an "eloquent witness" that the
"aerial bombardment of cities and factories" had become a "recognized part
of modem warfare as carried on by all nations."0 6 As a result, Taylor ob-
served that the decision was made at Nuremberg to avoid allegations arising
out of aerial warfare, a trial tactic that seemed well-advised in light of the
fact that the charges of illegal submarine warfare brought against Admirals
Raeder and Doenitz only met with "technical success.""2 7 He concluded that,
in his opinion, the legal and moral issues arising out of aerial and submarine
warfare could not be advanced or settled by the criminal process at Nurem-
berg.08
A second series of prosecutions were conducted by the occupying pow-
ers in Germany pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, an administrative
order that provided a uniform set of procedures and principles for Allied oc-
cupation courts." Once again, little attention was devoted to combat crimes
200. Id. at 526.
201. See id. at 559.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 563.
204. TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE





209. See Control Council Law No. 10, reprinted in VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 XVIII
(1952).
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or to aerial atrocities."'° Field Marshall Erhard Milch, Inspector General of
the Luftwaffe and State Secretary of the Air Ministry, was convicted of war
crimes and crimes against humanity based, in part, on his employment of
slave labor and prisoners of war in concentration camps."' Judge Michael A.
Musmanno, in his concurring opinion, contended that the fact that Luftwaffe
and Allied air raids unintentionally killed and injured women, children and
the elderly did not justify intentionally stripping civilians of their civil rights
and subjecting them to slave labor: the fact that "military necessity uninten-
tionally victimizes a civilian population" did not mean that "political domi-
nation may strip them of their civil rights and subject them to intentional tor-
ture and possible death."2 2 This statement by Judge Musmanno significantly
recognized that the humanitarian law of war authorized the incidental killing
of civilians and the destruction of civilian objects in aerial attacks against le-
gitimate military targets."'
The American Control Council Law No. 10 Court in the Einsatzgruppen
case offered an expanded analysis.1 The Tribunal dismissed the contention
that the defendants who organized and directed Nazi death squads must be
exonerated from the charge of killing civilian populations because Allied re-
gimes brought about the death of noncombatants through bombing.1 5 The
Court determined that Nazi Germany engaged in an aggressive war, which
included unprovoked aerial attacks against London, Coventry, Rotterdam
and Warsaw, as well as other population centers.1 6 The Allied Powers law-
fully retaliated and targeted Berlin, Dresden, Hamburg, Cologne, and addi-
tional German cities.1 7 These attacks concededly resulted in civilian deaths.
but even had they not been undertaken in response to the acts of Germany,
the Tribunal noted that there was "no parallelism between an act of legiti-
mate warfare, namely the bombing of a city, with a concomitant loss of ci-
vilian life, and the premeditated killing of all members of certain categories
of the civilian population in occupied territory."1 8
The Tribunal noted that cities were attacked for "tactical purposes," re-
sulting in the militarily advantageous destruction of communications, rail-
roads, ammunition plants and factories."9 The death and maiming of civil-
ians inevitably resulted from these attacks." This, according to the Tribunal,
210. See TAYLOR, supra note 204, at 65-66.
211. United States v. Milch, II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NEURNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, 353, 773, 797 (1950).
212. Id. at 797, 849-50 (Musmanno, J., concurring opinion).
213. See id.
214. United States v. Otto Ohlendorf et al., IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, 411 (1950).
215. Id. at 466.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 466-67.
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was distinct from an army dragging men, women and children from their
homes and intentionally executing them.
2 2
'
The single purpose of bombing, according to the Tribunal, was the ca-
pitulation of the besieged nation."2 Surrender resulted in the termination of
the attack and an end to the killing.23 The Nazi extermination of the Jews,
however, continued long after the termination of hostilities.2 4 This could not
be credibly characterized as an act of self-defense; the notion that Jews con-
stituted a menace to Germany was contrary to "all facts, all logic and all
law .
'225
This textual discussion strongly suggested that international law counte-
nanced the incidental killing of civilians during aerial bombing. 26 This, how-
ever, raised additional issues. Was there a point at which the number of
civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the value of the military tar-
get? Could a meaningful distinction be drawn between foreseeable and
intentional civilian injury? What obligation was there to take measures to
avoid civilian casualties? Was there an obligation to only undertake attacks
which endangered civilians as a last resort? Could the intentional targeting
of urban populations be condoned as an act of reprisal? Would the legiti-
macy of the humanitarian law of war suffer from a policy that countenanced
the intentional or incidental killing of civilian urban populations, most of
whom likely would be women, children, elderly, sick or infirm?2.7
VI. POST-NUREMBERG PROCEEDINGS
In June 1944, General Walter Warlimont, the Deputy Chief of Military
Operations in Berlin, wrote to his subordinates that enemy pilots should be
subjected to summary "lynch justice.2 128 The Foreign Office endorsed War-
limont's stance as a deterrent to enemy air attacks in a letter addressed to the
High Command of the Armed Forces.29 On May 30, 1944, Martin Bormann,
the Chief of the Party Chancellery, issued a secret circular to Nazi Party
leaders concerning "people's justice" against Allied pilots apprehended in
Germany.23 Bormann stated that over the past weeks English and American
221. Id. The Tribunal dismissed the analogy between intentionally shooting civilians and





225. Id. at 470.
226. See supra notes 214-25 and accompanying texts.
227. See id.
228. United States v. Josef Altstoetter, III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL CouNciL LAW No. 10, 954, 1095 (1951).
229. ld. at 1095-96.
230. See Secret Circular from Martin Bormann to Nazi Party Leaders, 30 May 1944,
Concerning "People's Justice Against Anglo-American Murderers," III TRIALS OF WAR
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fliers repeatedly strafed women, children, farmers and civilians from "a low
height, thus murdering in the most despicable manner defenseless civil-
ians--especially women and children. 1 He stated that on several occasions
crew members who were forced to abandon their craft were "lynched" by the
population.32 Bormann noted approvingly that police or criminal proceed-
ings had not been lodged against the perpetrators. 3 The Reich Chancellery,
in turn, transmitted Bormann's letter to the Justice Ministry. 3 Justice Minis-
ter Otto Thierack responded by directing that allegations of lynch justice
should be submitted to his office in order to determine whether the charges
should be quashed. 35 The American Tribunal in the Justice case determined
that the Justice Ministry intervened to frustrate criminal investigations of the
murder of Allied pilots and failed to find a single instance in which an in-
dictment was filed.236 The Court, in convicting defendant Herbert Klemm,
former State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, determined that he was
knowingly connected with suppressing the punishment of the murderers of
Anglo-American airmen. 37
The trial of Kurt Student, Commander-in-Chief of the German forces in
Crete, was the single post-World War II prosecution that directly addressed
liability for aerial bombardment. 38 The fourth charge in the eight-count in-
dictment issued by a British military court against Student alleged that, on
May 24, 1941, an aircraft under his command bombed a hospital marked
with a red cross.239 This occurred during an assault by German parachutists
on the Island of Crete.24' The prosecution alleged that the hospital could not
have been targeted by the thoroughly disciplined German troops absent the
knowledge and participation of the accused.' Student, however, was acquit-
ted based on the fact that he presumably was not involved in target selection
and, in any event, reconnaissance photos failed to reveal that the target was a
hospital. 42
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10, 577 (1951) [hereinafter Justice Docs.].
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. id. at 578.
234. Letter from Lammers to Reich Minister of Justice Thierack, 4 June 1944, Concern-
ing "People's Justice Against Anglo-American Murderers," and Enclosing Bormann's Circu-
lar to Nazi Party Leaders on this Subject; id. at 578, 579.
235. Id.
236. United States v. Josef Altstoetter, III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 1097-98 (1951).
237. Id. at 1095, 1099.
238. See Trial of Kurt Student, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Luneberg, Germany, 6th-10th May,
1946), IV L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 118 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 124 (Notes on the Case).
242. Id. at 120.
23
Lippman: Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: Tech
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002
24 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
A number of cases affirmed that captured Allied pilots were protected
prisoners of war.4 3 An American military commission on the unlawful kill-
ing of United States' prisoners of war convicted Albert Bury, former police
chief of Langenselbod, Kreis Hanau, Germany and Wilhelm Hafner, an offi-
cer under Bury's command." Hafner followed Bury's order to remove a
captured American airman to a secluded spot and shoot him.245 Bury alleged
Reich officials had ordered that "terror flyers" were no longer to be granted
the protections accorded to prisoners of war and were to be killed by lynch-
ing or beating. 6 Both of the accused were sentenced to death by hanging2 7
for violating their internationally imposed obligation to provide humane
treatment to prisoners of war.248
The United States Military Commission rejected the defense of superior
orders, determining that Bury possessed the latitude to determine whether or
not a specific flyer should be killed and there was no compelling reason to
have so expeditiously dispatched the captured pilot. 49 Hafner did not protest
or resist the order and when he reported to Bury that he had shot the pilot,
Bury replied, "[I]t is right so.''5'
Johannes Oenning, a former member of the Hitler youth, and Emil Nix,
who served as a police officer in the Reich, were accused of killing a Royal
Air Force Officer."' It was alleged Nix directed defendant Oenning and a
military police officer to do what they liked with the pilot.' The English of-
ficer was then taken to a secluded location, shot, and his body secretly bur-
ied. 3 Nix was acquitted while Oenning was convicted and sentenced to
eight years in prison. 4
Oberfeldwebel Karl Amberger was in charge of escorting five captured
Allied pilots to a railroad station.55 Amberger claimed he viewed the prison-
ers talking to one another in a suspicious fashion and, along with two others,
243. See Trial of Albert Bury and Wilhelm Hafner, (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, Freising, Ger-





248. Id. at 64 (Notes on the Case).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Trial of Johannes Oenning and Emil Nix, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Borken, Germany, 21st-
22nd Dec., 1945), XI L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 74 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. See also Trial of Hans Renoth and Three Others, (Brit. Milit. Ct., Elten, Ger-
many, 8th-10th Jan., 1946), XI L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 76 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n,
1949) (two German police officers and two customs officials convicted of beating to death an
American airman who enjoyed the status of a prisoner of war).
255. Trial of Karl Amberger (The Dreierwalde Case), (Brit. Milit. Ct., Wuppertal, Ger-
many, I lth-14th Mar., 1946), I L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM4. 81 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n,
1947) (killing of four Allied airmen who were prisoners of war).
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2002], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss1/2
2002] AERIAL ATTACKS AND THE HUMANITARIAN LAW OF WAR 25
opened fire, killing four of the pilots."6 He was convicted and sentenced to
death."7 The Court rejected the mitigating claim that Amberger believed the
prisoners had been responsible for killing forty civilians and airmen on the
airfield at Dreierwalde.258 The Court, in reaching this verdict, issued impor-
tant legal rulings, determining that airmen who were apprehended following
their descent from aircraft fell within the protection accorded to combatants,
who having laid down their arms, or having no means of defense, have
surrendered.5 9 The Court also explicitly ruled that the killing of prisoners of
war constituted a war crime under customary and positive international
law."w The Tribunal also clarified that a prisoner who was attempting to es-
cape, or was reasonably believed to be attempting to escape, may be
wounded or inadvertently killed.'
Japanese military men were convicted in several trials of the unfair and
illegal prosecution of captured Allied airmen in contravention of the rights to
be accorded to prisoners of war.6 In Isayama, fourteen American airmen
were captured by the Japanese Formosan Army and interrogated for alleged
violations of Formosan Military Law. 63 The law applied to enemy airmen
captured within the jurisdiction of the 10th Area Army, and provided pun-
ishment for individuals who engaged in a number of acts, including bombing
and strafing with the intent to wound, kill or intimidate civilians, destroying
non-military objectives or violating human rights by carrying out inhuman
acts.2" The punishment was death, but could be modified to life or to not less
than ten years' imprisonment.265 The charge was to be prosecuted before a
military tribunal composed of two army officers and one judicial officer ap-
pointed and supervised by the relevant commander.2
The United States Military Commission determined that the conviction
of the American airmen, in part, rested on falsified admissions of guilt en-
256. Id. at 83.
257. Id. at 83-84.
258. Id. at 84. Amberger's defense that the prisoners had attempted to escape was dis-
missed and he was convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. Id. at 83-84.
259. Id. at 85-86 (citing Hague Convention, supra note 8, art. 23(c)).
260. Id. at 86.
261. Id.
262. See Trial of Lieutenant-General Shigeru Sawada and Three Others, (U.S. Milit.
Comm'n, Shanghai, 27th Feb.-15th Apr., 1946), V L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. I (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
263. Trial of Lieutenant-General Harukei Isayama and Seven Others, (U.S. Milit.
Comm'n, Shanghai, lst-25th July, 1946), V L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRuAv. 60 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1948). These fourteen airmen were comprised of radiomen, photographers and gun-
ners who were captured between October 12, 1944, the date on which the law was issued, and
February 27, 1945. Id. at 61. The pilots and co-pilots were sent to Tokyo to stand trial. Id.
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tered into evidence. 6' The Americans were also not permitted to obtain evi-
dence or witnesses on their own behalf68 and were denied counsel and inter-
preters during their trials, which typically only lasted a single day.269 The
fourteen Americans were executed and buried in a mass grave on June 19,
1945.270 The Japanese defendants served in a variety of capacities at the tri-
als, including judges, prosecutors and responsible officers who were vari-
ously sentenced to terms ranging from twenty years to life in prison for par-
ticipating in illegal and false trials and unlawful killings.2"
In Hisakasu, five Japanese military men were convicted of participating
in an illegal, unfair and false trial, which resulted in the unlawful killing of
an American pilot.72 The prisoner had been charged with bombing a thirty-
ton civilian vessel in Hong Kong harbor, allegedly causing the death of eight
Chinese civilians. 3 The pilot was charged with violating the Japanese Air-
men Act, which condemned bombing, strafing or attacking the private prop-
erty of a non-military nature with the intent of destroying, damaging or burn-
ing.
274
The prosecution relied on two documents reciting the damage to the
vessel in addition to an investigative report and an interrogation of the ac-
cused in Japanese in which the pilot denied his involvement.2" The members
of the military court unanimously voted to convict the American and sen-
tenced him to death. 276 The Japanese defendants were convicted of participat-
ing in an illegal, unfair, false and null trial which resulted in the unlawful
killing of the accused, and were variously sentenced to imprisonment for pe-
riods ranging from fifty years to life or death by hanging. 27 The lead defen-
dant, General Tanaka Hisakasu, was condemned to death based on the fact
that he requested permission from Tokyo to conduct the trial, directed the
preparation of the report which was introduced into evidence, discussed
strategy with the prosecution on numerous occasions, approved the death
penalty and execution and failed to-submit the record and sentence for ap-
proval by his superior as required under Japanese military law. 8 The Court,
in reaching this decision, appeared to rely on the failure to provide the ac-
cused a lawyer or an opportunity to prepare his defense or to secure evi-
267. Id.
268. Id. at 62.
269. Id. at 65 (Notes on the Case).
270. Id. at 63.
271. Id. at 64.
272. Trial of General Tanaka Hisakasu and Five Others, (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, Shanghai,
13th Aug.-3rd Sept., 1946), V L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 66, 70 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n,
1948).
273. Id. at 67.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 68.
277. Id. at 70.
278. Id. at 69-70.
26
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2002], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss1/2
2002] AERIAL ATTACKS AND THE HUMANITARIAN LAW OF WAR 27
dence, the absence of witnesses to corroborate the documentary record, the
defendants' disregard of the accused's claim of innocence and the summary
nature of the proceedings.279
These cases established that the pilots and crew of military aircraft were
entitled to the rights and privileges accorded to prisoners of war.280 As pris-
oners, they may only be punished for violations of the laws and customs of
war following proceedings conducted in accordance with due process princi-
ples. 28'
In 1948, the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo convicted twenty-
five high-ranking Japanese civilian and military officials of crimes against
peace and war crimes.282 A central count concerned the treatment meted out
to captured American aviators. 83 Prime Minister Hideki Tojo issued retroac-
tive regulations applicable to eight pilots whose planes were shot down dur-
ing the first American raid on Tokyo on April 18, 1942.284 These regulations,
dated August 13, 1942, were applicable to enemy fliers who raided Japan,
Manchukuo or Japanese operational areas. 285 Offenses enumerated in the law
included air attacks against civilians, private property of a non-military na-
ture and non-military objectives, as well as other violations of international
humanitarian law. 86 Violations of the regulations were punishable by death
or imprisonment for ten years or more.287 The International Tribunal at To-
kyo observed, with some irony, that the Japanese themselves engaged in an
indiscriminate bombing campaign in China.288
The American fliers were held in solitary confinement, tortured for
eighteen days and eventually signed inculpatory statements written in Japa-
nese, which they did not comprehend.28 9 The Americans then were starved
and ill-treated: three were sentenced to death and five were condemned to
life imprisonment."' This established the precedent. Enemy aviators who
were apprehended were starved, tortured and often killed without trial.2 9' In
those instances in which court-martials were conducted, the proceedings
typically were a mere formality.29 2 In June 1945, the Commandant of the
279. Id. at 71 (Notes on the Case).
280. See supra notes 243-61 and accompanying texts.
281. See supra notes 262-79 and accompanying texts.
282. See International Military Tribunal at Tokyo (1948), in II THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1029, 1157-59 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter Tokyo War
Crimes Trial].
283. Id. at 1067.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1067-68.
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Military Police for Japan wrote to various subordinates expressing his view
that trials were unnecessarily delaying executions; consequently, ninety
aviators were immediately killed. 3 Others died as a result of torture while
those who were executed were variously subjected to firing squads, decapita-
tion or immolated by civilian crowds after being paraded through the
streets .2 94
Prime Minister Hideki Tojo was determined to have been aware of the
mistreatment of the aviators and yet failed to take adequate steps to prevent
their abuse; he was convicted of this and other crimes295 and sentenced to
death.296 War Minister Shunroko Hata was also found to have breached his
duty to safeguard prisoners297 and was convicted of various offenses and sen-
tenced to life in prison.299
The post-Nuremberg prosecutions conspicuously avoided addressing the
international legality of aerial attacks. The trials, however, clearly estab-
lished that pilots who were apprehended were to be accorded prisoner of war
status and were entitled to due process protections in prosecutions for war
crimes.2 9 Pilots, unlike civilian victims of air attacks, were thus to be ac-
corded protection under the humanitarian law of war."°
VII. HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI
The Tokyo Tribunal condemned Japanese massacres and atrocities in
China while failing to address Japanese aerial tactics."' The Tribunal may
have anticipated that this might invite the defense that the United States
grossly and wantonly violated international law by deploying the atomic
bomb. 2 The official American rationale was that the bomb preserved the
lives of combatants who otherwise would have been killed in an invasion of
Japan.3"3 There are substantial questions as to whether the bomb was de-
ployed for strategic reasons as opposed to the rationales of revenge, projec-
tion of American power and intimidation of the Soviet Union.' The atomic
293. Id. at 1069.
294. Id. at 1070.
295. Id. at 1154.
296. Id. at 1158.
297. Id. at 1131.
298. Id. at 1157.
299. See supra notes 282-98 and accompanying texts.
300. Id.
301. Tokyo War Crimes Trial, supra note 282, at 1055-56.
302. See Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology And International Law: The Dissent of the In-
dian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 373, 392 (1991).
303. The figure as to lives saved was as high as five hundred thousand. Gar Alperovitz
dismisses this figure as inflated and sets the figure at seven thousand to eight thousand. GAR
ALPEROVITZ, THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF AN
AMERICAN MYTH 518 (1995).
304. Id. at 519, 523-27.
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bomb also raised significant legal issues pertaining to the safety and security
of civilians, which only received superficial examination during the deci-
sion-making process by the American executive branch."'
The deployment of this "doomsday" weapon eroded American restraints
on aerial bombardment." 6 Decision-makers now abandoned the official pol-
icy against aerial attacks on noncombatants and accepted that this might con-
stitute a humane policy, which could expeditiously end the war. 7 This was
rationalized on the grounds that the entire Japanese population, including
children, was involved in the war effort and therefore an appropriate target
of attack."' There also was a moral imperative: restraints on the deployment
of armed force must be loosened in a conflict that threatened the very sur-
vival of America." Still, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson would later
write regretfully that in this "last great action of the Second World War we
were given final proof that ... [w]ar in the twentieth century has grown
steadily more barbarous, more destructive, more debased, in all aspects.'310
In 1963, in Shimoda, a Tokyo District Court determined that the United
States atomic attack on Japan contravened international legal standards.31" '
The Court, however, went on to determine that the plaintiffs lacked legal
standing to recover damages from the Japanese government.1 The Tribunal
observed that the atomic bomb was "stronger" than weapons of the past in
"power of destruction and casualty"3 '3 and constituted a "really cruel
weapon."3 '4 The Court stressed that while there was no express prohibition
on the deployment of atomic bombs during World War II, the weapon con-
travened core principles of the humanitarian law of war.3"5
The Japanese panel stated that according to the customary international
law of land warfare, a defended city is a locale resisting occupation by en-
emy forces; a city that is distant from the battlefield and not in danger of en-
emy occupation, even where armed with defensive installations, is catego-
305. See id. at 529.
306. See RONALD TAKAKI, HIROSHIMA: WHY AMERICA DROPPED THE ATOMIC BOMB 6-7,
14(1995).
307. Id. at 26-27.
308. Id. at 28.
309. Id. at 28-29. Hiroshima had served as an assembly area for troops. Id. at 46. The
United Strategic Bombing Survey confirmed that 3,243 troops were killed. Id. Seventy thou-
sand were instantly killed and, by 1950, another one hundred and thirty thousand had likely
died as a result of injury or radiation. Id. at 47.
310. Quoted in id. at 130-31.
311. Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State (355 Hanrei Jiho 17), reprinted in 8 JAP.
ANNUAL INT'L L. 212 (1964). See also Richard A. Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Ap-
praisal of the Atomic Attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 759
(1965).
312. Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State (355 Hanrei Jiho 17), reprinted in 8 JAP.
ANNUAL INT'L L. 212, 242-50 (1964).
313. Id. at 233.
314. Id. at 234.
315. Id. at 235.
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rized as an undefended city."6 Indiscriminate attacks were permitted against
the former, while only bombardment of military objectives was permitted
against the latter.317 The Court argued that the Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare
incorporated and refined this distinction and were regarded as an authorita-
tive source in regards to air warfare." 8 Neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki were
within the zone of conflict or resisted Allied occupation and, accordingly,
were immune from attack.1 9
The deployment of an atomic bomb was equivalent to the "blind" bom-
bardment of these locales and constituted "an illegal act of hostility as the
indiscriminate aerial bombardment on undefended cities. '32" The Court ac-
cepted that an attack might be mounted on an entire zone containing a well-
fortified military objective because the damage to non-military objectives
likely would be "small in comparison with the large military interests and
necessity."32' However, neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki contained concen-
trations of major military objectives that might be permissibly targeted. 322
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were also contrary to the
prohibitions under international law on the imposition of "unnecessary pain
in war" and the employment of "inhumane means" of "injuring the en-
emy. ''3" The Court found that the atomic bomb had caused superfluous and
unnecessary injury to civilians, the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and
that their offspring remained imperiled as a result of radiation eighteen years
following the attack.32 ' The impact of the bomb was analogous and more se-
vere than the pain resulting from poison and poison gas, which were prohib-
ited under the humanitarian law of war.323
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed the Tokyo Court's
general analysis in 1996.326 The Court could not preclude that the threat or
use of nuclear weapons would be permissible in instances of self-defense or
survival, but held that nuclear weapons were "scarcely reconcilable" with the
humanitarian law of war, which precluded the utilization of weapons inher-
316. id. at 236, 238.
317. Id. at 238.
318. Id. at 237 (citing and quoting Rules of Aerial Warfare, supra note 94).
319. Id. at 239.
320. Id. The District Court recognized that the notion of total war was leading to an ex-
pansion of scope of military targets. Id. However, this notion is not so expansive as to include
schools, churches, monuments, hospitals and private homes and property. Id. at 239-40.
321. Id. at 240.
322. Id.
323. Id. This involves a balance between military necessity, efficiency and humane feel-
ings. Id.
324. Id. at 241.
325. Id. at 241-42.
326. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
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ently incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets or
which resulted in "unnecessary suffering to combatants. 327
It is painful to quote Justice Radhabinod Pal of India, dissenting to the
judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, who ob-
served, the "decision to use the atom bomb is the only near approach to the
directives of the German Emperor during the first world war and of the Nazi
leaders during the second world war. 328 The aerial bombardment of civilian
populations was now an accepted wartime tactic.
VIII. VIETNAM
The United States pursued a policy of unrestricted bombing in Vietnam
designed to terrorize the peasantry and to deny safe haven to the enemy.29
Noam Chomsky, writing in 1971, contended the conflict in Indochina consti-
tuted a "record of war crimes and crimes against humanity, a record of
mounting horror.""33 He noted that since the early 1960s, American forces
had been involved in "bombing, strafing, forced population removal of mil-
lions of peasants, crop destruction and defoliation, destruction of agricultural
lands and the irrigation system." '331 Gabriel Kolko wrote that the United
States transformed South Vietnam into a "sea of fire as a matter of policy,
turning an entire nation into a target .... [I]t destroys villages, slaughters all
who are in the way, uproots families, and shatters a whole society.""33
Chomsky reported that half of the South Vietnamese population had
been killed, injured or driven from their homes.333 Refugees recounted living
in caves and tunnels in order to protect themselves against the bombing, and
fleeing ever-deeper into the safety of the forest.3 Chomsky described mil-
lions of acres pockmarked with bomb craters and a half a million acres of
crop land poisoned by defoliants and lying fallow.333 By the end of 1969, the
United States had deployed an air ordinance volume in Vietnam and Laos
327. Id. para. 95. The Court could not "reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or
illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence,
in which its very survival would be at stake." Id. para. 97.
328. Quoted in FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE CRIMINALITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 71
(2002). See generally Guenter Lewy, Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, and the Dictates of
Conscience: The Dilemma of Military Obedience in the Atomic Age, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 3,
3 (1961).
329. Noam Chomsky, The Rule of Force in International Affairs, 80 YALE L.J. 1456,
1471 (1971).
330. Id. at 1472.
331. Id.
332. Gabriel Kolko, War Crimes and the Nature of the Vietnam War, in CRIMES OF WAR:
A LEGAL, POLITICAL-DOCUMENTARY, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF LEADERS, CITIZENS, AND SOLDIERS FOR CRIMINAL ACTS IN WARS 403, 412 (Richard A.
Falk et al. eds., 1971).
333. Chomsky, supra note 329, at 1474.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1472-73.
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twice as large as that which it employed during World War 11.336 Seventy
tons of bombs were dropped for every square mile of North and South Viet-
nam; and over five hundred pounds of bombs were dropped for every indi-
vidual."' Pilots fired indiscriminately at targets within free fire zones and
pursued a scorched earth strategy to deny resources to guerillas.33 The vi-
ciousness of this policy was illustrated in 1964 by the employment of fifty
thousand tons of napalm, a highly flammable liquid weapon that scorched
the body, and cluster bombs, which scattered hundreds of steel pellets at
high velocity over a wide area."' Civilian defense analyst Daniel Ellsberg,
the purveyor of the Pentagon Papers, wrote that American decision-makers
utilized euphemistic phrases such as "water-drip technique," "hot-cold
treatment" and "salami-slice," to avoid confronting the insidious implica-
tions of their policies.3" He noted, in retrospect, that this was the antiseptic
"language of torturers."
34 1
The United States concurred with the position of the International
Committee of the Red Cross that the parties to the Vietnam conflict were
bound by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for
the "protection of the victims of war. '3 2 The United States protested that
North Vietnam's parading of American airmen through Hanoi was a viola-
tion of the 1949 Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which
stipulated that prisoners must be safeguarded against violence, intimidation
and public curiosity.343 Hanoi responded that the 1949 Geneva Convention
was inapplicable because neither North Vietnam nor the United States had
formally declared a state of war.3' This, of course, disregarded the fact that
the text of the Convention stipulated that it "shall apply to all cases of de-
clared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recog-
336. EDWARD S. HERMAN, ATROCITIES IN VIETNAM: MYTHS AND REALITIES 55 (1970).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 62.
339. Id. at 72. See also Michel Krepon, Weapons Potentially Inhumane: The Case of
Cluster Bombs, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 595, 595-605 (1974) (discussing the use of napalm and clus-
ter bombs in Vietnam).
340. DANIELELLSBERG, PAPERS ON THE WAR 319-20 (1972).
341. Id. at 320.
342. See Letter, dated June 11, 1965, on behalf of Jacques Freymond, Vice President of
the International Committee of the Red Cross, to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, reprinted
in 4 I.L.M. 1171 (1965); Letter, dated Aug. 10, 1965, from U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
to Jacques Freymond, Vice President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, re-
printed in 4 I.L.M. 1173 (1965) (discussing Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287).
343. Thomas H. Sponsler, The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the Threatened
Trial of American Airmen, 15 Loy. L. REV. 43, 57 (1968-69) (quoting Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135)
[hereinafter POW Convention].
344. Sponsler, supra note 343, at 57.
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nized by one of them. '35 In addition, a declaration of war was not a requisite
to recognizing a state of armed conflict under international law.3"6
In 1965, the North Vietnamese regime informed the Red Cross that the
United States and its South Vietnamese allies were engaging in a war of
"great atrocity" and employing arms and methods of warfare, which have
"long been prohibited by international law." '347 The Vietnamese condemned
the United States for engaging in a war of aggression and for violating the
humanitarian law of war through the indiscriminate utilization of napalm and
chemicals; arbitrary attacks on hospitals, schools, markets, and villages; and
the massacre of innocent civilians.34 The North Vietnamese regarded these
as the actions of "pirates" and "major criminals," in violation of the laws of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.349 Support for this policy of prosecu-
tion could be found in the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to the
Geneva Conventions to detain and to punish individuals alleged to have
committed "grave breaches" of the Convention before their domestic courts
or to hand such individuals over to another High Contracting Party for
trial.3 50
The North Vietnamese were admonished that they would be cast as war
criminals in the event that they prosecuted and punished American pilots and
that such retaliation would be certain, severe and swift.' It was pointed out
that the aerial bombardment of population centers was an accepted tactic of
modem warfare and that pilots should not be subject to criminal punishment
345. Id. (quoting Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31).
346. Id. at 57.
347. Letter, dated Aug. 31, 1965, from Bui Tan Linh, acting head of the Cabinet, to the
International Red Cross, Application of Geneva Conventions in Viet-Nam: Letter of Democ-
ratic Republic of Viet-Nam, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 124 (1966).
348. Id.
349. Id. This was consistent with the view of North Korea and the People's Republic of
China during the Korean conflict that soldiers fighting for the "bourgeois" and "imperialist"
forces were war criminals who were not entitled to international protection. Sponsler, supra
note 343, at 56-57 (quoting Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea (Ministry of De-
fense, 1955), quoted in Howard S. Levine, Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of Prisoners of
War, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 433, 443 n.37 (1962)). A prisoner of war may not "be tried or sen-
tenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international
law, in force at the time the said act was committed." POW Convention, supra note 343, art.
99. The North Vietnamese filed a reservation to Article 85. Sponsler, supra note 343, at 58.
Article 85 provided that prisoners of war "prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power
for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present
Convention." POW Convention, supra note 343, art. 85.
350. Sponsler, supra note 343, at 57 (quoting POW Convention, supra note 343, art.
129). The relevant "grave breaches" included willful killing and torture or inhuman treatment,
as well as the extensive destruction and appropriation of property "not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-Wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
351. Sponsler, supra note 343, at 63-64.
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for carrying out lawful orders.352 In the end, the North Vietnamese capitu-
lated to international pressure and announced that they would not subject
American airmen to trial. 53
Telford Taylor, the former lead United States prosecutor at Nuremberg,
concluded that American aerial tactics in Vietnam, which targeted entire vil-
lages thought to harbor guerillas, flagrantly violated the prohibition in the
Geneva Convention on "collective penalties" and "reprisals" against inno-
cent civilians."' Taylor argued that this disproportionate and indiscriminate
deployment of armed force was distinct from a situation in which bombing
was directed at a military target and incidentally injured civilians or dam-
aged private property 5 He noted that it was a war crime to shoot the inhabi-
tants of a village and it would be equally criminal to kill them through an ae-
rial assault. 6
The North Vietnamese, whatever the merits of their claims, were justi-
fiably criticized for threatening to contravene the due process rights ac-
corded to pilots under international law and, in the end, were deterred from
prosecuting an entire category and class of pilots as war criminals.37 At the
same time, the condemnation of their planned prosecutions, in part, was also
indicative of the fact that aerial bombardment of civilian targets was suffi-
ciently common that this practice had largely been removed from the pur-
view of international legal regulation.58
IX. PROTOCOL I TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
In 1977, the United States Air Force issued a manual to clarify the law
of air warfare.3 "9 The pamphlet significantly proclaimed that the principles of
the law of armed conflict are the same in land, sea or air warfare, but may
vary in application.36
The manual was clarified and extended in the 1977 Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflict, which is generally recog-
nized as embodying customary international law regarding the protection of
civilians in armed conflict. 61 Article 49 of the Convention provides a single
352. Id. at 64.
353. Id. at 65.
354. See TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 144-45(1970) (quoting Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 342, art. 33).
355. Id. at 142-43.
356. Id. at 145.
357. See supra notes 347-53 and accompanying texts.
358. See TAYLOR, supra note 354, at 38-40, 143.
359. See DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 94, at 1-1.
360. Id.
361. Protocol I, supra note 10. See George Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratifica-
tions of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1
34
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2002], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss1/2
2002] AERIAL ATTACKS AND THE HUMANITARIAN LAW OF WAR 35
standard for all means and methods of warfare and provides that the articles
pertaining to civilians apply to "all attacks from the sea or from the air
against objectives on land. ' 362
Article 48 sets forth the principle of discrimination and stipulates that
the Parties to a conflict shall "at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objec-
tives. ' ' 363 Belligerents, accordingly, shall only direct their attack against mili-
tary targets. 364 The commentary to the Convention observes that this provi-
sion is the touchstone of the modem humanitarian law of war.36 The modem
development of long-range artillery and the lengthy reach and lethal charac-
ter of aerial urban bombardment necessitated that the humanitarian law of
war explicitly and clearly distinguish and differentiate between permissible
military and impermissible civilian targets.' 6
Article 51 affirms the customary rule that the innocent civilian popula-
tion and individual civilians shall be protected against "dangers arising from
military operations."367 Acts or threats of violence whose primary purpose is
to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited,368 along with
indiscriminate attacks that strike civilian and military objectives without dis-
tinction.369 The commentary observes that this affirms the "unlawful charac-
ter of certain regrettable practices" during World War II, intended to "de-
stroy all life in a particular area or to raze a town to the ground" without a
"substantial military" advantage. 3"7 These indiscriminate attacks include
bombardments not directed at a specific military objective,37' assaults em-
ploying methods or "means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific
(1991). See generally David G. Burwell, Civilian Protection in Modern Warfare: A Critical
Analysis of the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949, 14 VA. J. INT'LL. 123 (1973).
362. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 49(3). For a definition of civilian, see id. art. 50.
363. Id. art. 48.
364. Id.
365. International Committee for the Red Cross, Commentaries to the Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, para. 1863 (art. 48), available
at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (last visited June 14, 2002) thereinafter Commentaries].
366. Id. para. 1866. The "customary rule was affected to such an extent that one might
have wondered whether it still existed." Id. The "repeated use of reprisals" resulted in the sys-
tematic attack on "towns and their inhabitants." Id. para. 1867.
367. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(1).
368. Id. art. 51(2). Civilians shall be protected under the Convention "unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities." Id. art. 51(3).
369. Id. art. 51(4). The commentary pertaining to civilians distinguishes between direct
participation in hostilities and participation in the war effort. Commentaries, supra note 365,
para. 1945 (art. 51). Absent this differentiation, there would be no meaningful distinction be-
tween civilians and combatants under the humanitarian law of war. Id.
370. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 1946 (art. 51).
371. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(4)(a). For a definition of military targets, see id.
art. 52(2). Belligerents possess a duty to spare civilians and civilian objects. Id. art. 57. A
military objective may not result in excessive civilian injury "in relation to the expected direct
and specific military advantage." Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 1953 (art. 51).
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military objective," '372 and methods or means of combat "the effects of which
cannot be limited.
'373
Article 51 also categorizes a bombardment as indiscriminate which
"treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and dis-
tinct military objectives located in a city town, village or other area contain-
ing a concentration of civilians or civilian objects. ' 374 This was intended to
prohibit carpet or saturation bombing that would likely injure or harm civil-
ians .3" An additional category of indiscriminate attack is a bombing that
"may be expected" to cause incidental injury or death or damage to civilian
property that "would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct mili-
tary advantage anticipated. 3 76 Ambiguity and doubt should be resolved in
favor of the protection of the civilian population3 77 and, in any event, inci-
dental civilian losses and damages should "never be extensive. 3 78
Reprisals against the civilian population or civilians are prohibited.379
This provision was a reaction to the reliance on reprisals during World War
II to justify waging war "almost indiscriminately" which "resulted in count-
less civilian victims." '380 The prohibition is expressed in a "peremptory char-
acter" and does not admit to derogation on the grounds of military necessity
or exigency.381 The presence or movement of civilian populations also shall
not be utilized to immunize certain objects or areas from attack. 82 This is in-
tended to prevent civilians from being deployed as a shield against an armed
assault. 383
Article 52 reiterates that civilian objects shall not be subject to attack or
reprisal84 and defines military objects as targets "which by their nature, loca-
tion, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
372. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(4)(b). This encompasses both weapons and the
mode of employing weapons that cannot be directed at specific military objective. Commen-
taries, supra note 365, para. 1957 (art. 51).
373. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(4)(c). This is directed at the deployment of a
weapon, such as fire or water, under circumstances in which they cannot be limited,
Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 1963 (art. 51), as well as weapons with inherently indis-
criminate effects, such as bacteriological agents or nuclear weapons. Id. paras. 1965-66.
374. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(5)(a).
375. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 1968 (art. 51).
376. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(5)(b).
377. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 1979 (art. 51).
378. Id. para. 1980. "The Protocol does not provide any justification for attacks which
cause extensive civilian losses and damages. Incidental losses and damages should never be
extensive." Id. These provisions should lead those responsible for such attacks "to take all
necessary precautions before making their decision, even in the difficult constraints of battle
conditions." Id. para. 1981.
379. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(6).
380. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 1982 (art. 51).
381. Id. para. 1984. Reprisals are limited to a choice of weapons and methods of combat
used against military objectives. Id. para. 1985.
382. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(7).
383. See Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 1985 (art. 51).
384. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 52(1).
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whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.""38 In in-
stances of doubt as to whether an object is customarily utilized for civilian
purposes, such as when a church or school is being used "to make an effec-
tive contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used." '386
The commentary notes that objects whose "nature" makes a contribution
to military action includes material directly utilized by the armed forces,
such as weapons, equipment, fortifications and command centers.387 Various
objects assume military significance based on their "location," including
bridges or seaports.38 "Purpose" and "use" anticipates that a locale, such as a
hotel, might be utilized to house troops or to serve as a command center. 39 A
site's destruction, capture or neutralization must provide a "definite military
advantage.""39 It is not sufficient that an attack only offers a potential or inde-
terminate benefit.9 ' Potential injury to civilians also must be taken into ac-
count in targeting.392
Article 54 prohibits military operations "to attack, destroy, remove or
render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian popula-
tion." '393 This includes attacking foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water
installations and irrigation works for the specific purpose of denying suste-
nance to the civilian population.94 These objects also shall not be the targets
of reprisals. 9
Article 57 imposes a burden of "constant care" to "spare" civilians and
civilian objects.396 Accordingly, individuals planning or ordering an attack
shall "do everything feasible" to verify that the objectives to be assaulted are
neither civilians nor civilian objects.3 97 The burden is on the commanding of-
ficer to ensure that information is accurate and to require additional data in
the event of doubt or uncertainty. 398 Individuals planning or ordering an at-
tack shall also take "all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack" to avoid or to minimize incidental loss of civilian life, in-
385. Id. art. 52(2).
386. Id. art. 52(3).
387. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 2020 (art. 52).
388. Id. para. 2021.
389. Id. para. 2022. Factories devoted to the production of consumer "dual function" as
well as military goods may be subject to attack depending upon the loss of human life and
anticipated military advantage, Id. para. 2023.
390. Id. para. 2024.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 54(2).
394. Id. Derogation from Article 54 is permissible when required by imperative military
necessity to defend a national territory against invasion. Id. art. 54(5).
395. Id. Starvation of civilians is prohibited. Id. art. 54(1). The prohibition shall not ap-
ply to the means of sustenance for members of the armed forces. Id. art. 54(3).
396. Id. art. 57(1).
397. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i).
398. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 2195 (art. 57).
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jury or damage to civilians.399 Decision-makers are to adhere to the principle
of proportionality and to refrain from an attack that "may be expected" to
cause incidental injury or loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects
"which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military ad-
vantage anticipated."'
An attack must be cancelled or suspended in the event it is determined
that the assault is not aimed at a military target or may be expected to cause
excessive damage."' Effective advance warning is required for attacks that
"may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit." 2
In those instances in which a choice is presented between several military
objectives yielding the same military advantage, decision-makers shall select
that objective which "may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian
lives and to civilian objects.""4 3 Article 57 also specifically provides that in
the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, belligerents shall take
"all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to
civilian objects."41
According to the commentary to Article 57, the phrase "everything fea-
sible" connotes "everything that was practicable or practically possible, tak-
ing into account all the circumstances at the time of the attack." 5 The text
cautions that this should not be qualified by considerations of the "success of
military operations," because this might cause decision-makers to neglect the
requisite "humanitarian obligations." 6 The interpretation of the phrase "eve-
rything feasible," as with the entire Protocol, shall be guided by considera-
tions of "common sense and good faith." 7
Article 58 provides that Parties to a conflict, to the extent "feasible,"
shall remove the civilian population and material under their control from
399. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
400. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii). This requires a balance between the necessities of war and hu-
manitarian requirements. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 2206 (art. 57). Military com-
manders must utilize common sense and good faith in weighing the humanitarian and military
interests involved. Id. para. 2208. The danger posed to the civilian population and civilian ob-
jects depends upon the proximity of the civilians to the military target, the danger posed by
the terrain, the accuracy of the weapons, weather conditions, the danger posed by the military
target, and the ability of the belligerents to deliver the munitions to the target. Commentaries,
supra note 365, para. 2212 (art. 57). In instances of doubt, the duty to spare civilians and ci-
vilian objects in the conduct of military operations is the guiding principle. Id. para. 2215.
401. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 57(2)(b). This applies to those carrying out the attack
as well as to decision-makers. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 2221 (art. 57). Of course,
the increased range of attack complicates verification. Id. paras. 2220-21.
402. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 57(2)(c). This is intended to permit civilians to protect
themselves. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 2225 (art. 57).
403. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 57(3).
404. Id. art. 57(4).
405. Commentaries, supra note 365, para. 2198 (art. 57).
406. Id.
407. Id. Individuals launching an attack are to "take the necessary identification meas-
ures in good time in order to spare the population as far as possible. It is not clear how the
success of military operations could be jeopardized by this." Id.
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the vicinity of military objectives, 8 avoid locating military objectives within
or proximate to densely populated areas,"° and take "other necessary precau-
tions" to safeguard the civilian population and civilian objects under their
control against the dangers of military operations.""0
In summary, the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, in reaction
to the targeting of civilians during World War II, establishes a clear obliga-
tion on belligerents to protect and to safeguard civilians during military op-
erations.4" The Protocol prohibits the direct targeting of and reprisals against
civilians, '12 as well as indiscriminate attacks imperiling civilian popula-
tions." 3 The Convention also contains a comprehensive definition of permis-
sible military targets.414 A specific duty of care is placed on belligerents in
planning and carrying out attacks,4 5 as well as on those States with actual or
legal control over civilian populations."6 Article 85 enumerates grave
breaches of the Protocol constituting war crimes when causing death or seri-
ous injury to the body or health.4 17 These include selecting a civilian popula-
tion or individual civilians as the object of attack;"8 launching an indiscrimi-
nate attack on a civilian population or civilian objects with the knowledge
that such attacks "will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects; 419 targeting non-defended localities and demili-
tarized zones;42 0 and "launching an attack against works or installations con-
taining dangerous forces in the knowledge that such an attack will cause ex-
cessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects."4 "1 The
Protocol's principles and protections provided a framework of analysis that
was rapidly swept aside by the exigencies of modem war and the advancing
technology of air attacks.
408. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 58(a).
409. Id. art. 58(b).
410. Id. art. 58(c). Article 59 prohibits Parties to the conflict from attacking "non-
defended localities." Id. art. 59(1). The term feasible was utilized to stress "that no one can be
required to do the impossible. In this case it is clear that precautions should not go beyond the
point where the life of the population would become difficult or even impossible." Commen-
taries, supra note 365, para. 2245 (art. 59). In addition, a belligerent "cannot be expected to
arrange its armed forces and installations in such a way as to make them conspicuous to the
benefit of the adversary." Id. para. 2246.
411. See supra notes 363-64 and accompanying texts.
412. See supra notes 367-83 and accompanying texts.
413. See supra notes 370-78 and accompanying texts.
414. See supra notes 384-92 and accompanying texts.
415. See supra notes 396-404 and accompanying texts.
416. See supra notes 408-10 and accompanying texts.
417. Protocol I, supra note 10, arts. 85(3)-(5).
418. Id. art. 85(3)(a).
419. Id. art. 85(3)(b).
420. Id. art. 85(3)(d).
421. Id. art. 85(3)(c).
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X. THE GULF WAR
On August 2, 1990, one hundred and twenty thousand Iraqi troops in-
vaded and occupied neighboring Kuwait.42 The United Nations Security
Council acted expeditiously in condemning the invasion and demanding
Iraq's unconditional withdrawal, 23 freezing foreign assets, imposing eco-
nomic sanctions, 2 ' and calling for the utilization of all necessary means to
restore international peace and security. 25 A thirty-nine day assault by Coali-
tion Forces drove Iraq from Kuwait and reinstated the Emir of Kuwait.4 26
A privately organized International War Crimes Tribunal convicted the
United States of nineteen crimes allegedly committed by American forces
during the Gulf War.427 These offenses, in part, included the intentional de-
struction of "facilities essential to civilian life and to economic productiv-
ity,"" the indiscriminate deployment of weapons of mass destruction... and
the intentional attack on "installations containing dangerous substances and
forces."43
The initial complaint drafted by the Commission of Inquiry recorded
that the United States flew one hundred and ten thousand sorties, dropping
eighty-eight thousand tons of bombs which, in aggregate, were roughly
seven times more powerful than the atomic bomb that destroyed Hi-
roshima. '31 Only seven percent of the bombs utilized were laser guided
''smart bombs." '432 These reportedly were accurate eighty to ninety percent of
the time, while conventional unguided bombs missed their targets approxi-
mately seventy-five percent of the time. '33 This meant that seventy percent of
the bombs dropped during the Gulf War were inaccurate. 34
422. Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical His-
tory of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387, 389 (1994).
423. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
424. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
425. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
426. af Jochnick & Normand, supra note 422, at 390. The United States suffered two
hundred forty casualties. Id. at 391.
427. International War Crimes Tribunal, United States War Crimes Against Iraq, Final
Judgment: International War Crimes Tribunal (1992), available at
http://deoxy.org/wc/warcrim3.htm (last visited June 14, 2002). The full report absent the
judgment is contained in RAMSEY CLARK ET AL., WAR CRIMES: A REPORT ON UNITED STATES
WAR CRIMES AGAINST IRAQ 1 (1992) [hereinafter CLARK I].
428. CLARK 1, supra note 427, at 14.
429. Id. at 14-17.
430. Id. at 18.
431. Id. at 14.
432. Francis Kelly, War Crimes Committed Against the People of Iraq, in CLARK I, su-
pra note 427, at 47.
433. Id. at 47-48.
434. Id.
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This inaccuracy resulted in inadvertent injury to noncombatants and
damage to civilian homes and facilities. '35 Thirty percent of the total tonnage
was dropped from B-52s flying at forty thousand feet and releasing five
hundred or seven hundred and fifty pound bombs over densely populated ar-
eas.436 In some instances the Coalition allegedly engaged in indiscriminate
attacks. The Commission, for instance, alleged that Iraq's second largest city
of Basra was carpet-bombed by B-52s."3' Ramsey Clark, with some exag-
geration, set the death toll of Iraqis during the Gulf War at one hundred and
fifty thousand civilians, including at least one hundred thousand postwar
deaths. '38
The most devastating attack on civilians occurred when the United
States sent a laser-guided ordinance down a ventilation shaft, destroying the
al-Amariyah bomb shelter in Baghdad and killing at least three hundred peo-
ple, and perhaps as many as one thousand six hundred. '39 The American
military claimed this was a command and control center and therefore a le-
gitimate target."0 Critics, however, alleged the building had served as a civil-
ian shelter for several weeks. 4 '
Some contended that the United States deliberately targeted and endan-
gered civilians in order to lower morale, disrupt the Iraqi economy and cre-
ate an increased dependency on the West."2 They pointed to the September
1990 statement by Air Force Chief of Staff, Michael Dugan, who announced
that the United States' aim was to damage the Iraqi regime by attacking
downtown Baghdad and bombing power stations, roads and petroleum pro-
duction facilities."3
Critics pointed out that the United States' target list was designed to in-
flict political and economic harm rather than achieve a military advantage.4"
Sixteen power stations were bombed, reducing electrical output to four per-
cent of the prewar capacity, creating a public health emergency." This de-
435. Id. The claim that this was a technologically sophisticated air campaign also is be-
lied by the fact that roughly eighty-two thousand tons of bombs were non-precision guided
conventional bombs and only seven thousand tons were guided bombs. Paul Walker, U.S.
Bombing-The Myth of Surgical Bombing in the Gulf War, in CLARK I, supra note 427, at 83,
87.
436. Walker, supra note 435, at 87. See also RAMSEY CLARK, THE FIRe THIS TIME: U.S.
WAR CRIMES IN THE GULF 74 (1992) [hereinafter CLARK 1I].
437. Kelly, supra note 432, at 48. The United States deployed fire bombs, napalm and
concussion bombs. Walker, supra note 435, at 86.
438. CLARK 1I, supra note 436, at 83. The indirect effects include the damaged infra-
structure, safety and health services and disease. Id. at 84.
439. Kelly, supra note 432, at 48-49.
440. Id. at 49.
441. Id.
442. CLARK II, supra note 436, at 61.
443. Id. Dugan was terminated following this statement. Id.
444. Id. at 59-64.
445. af Jochnick & Normand, supra note 422, at 403-04. Absent electricity, water could
not be purified, sewage treated, water borne diseases multiplied and hospitals lacked adequate
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struction proved to be of minimal military import relative to the amount of
civilian suffering because the Coalition already eliminated command and
control and communication facilities, weapons plants, troop concentrations
and various other military targets."6 Iraq, in any event, reportedly possessed
alternative military power and communication facilities."7 Despite the fact
that the Iraqi military stockpiled sufficient oil to support the war, the Coali-
tion decimated the oil industry."8 Aerial attacks also were directed against
civilian vehicles, bridges and factories producing textiles, foodstuffs, ce-
ment, household goods and other commercial products."9 In addition, hospi-
tals throughout the country were bombed. 5' The detrimental impact of this
aerial campaign is illustrated by a survey of sixteen thousand Iraqi children,
which concluded that the postwar increase in "disease and malnutrition
caused child mortality to triple, resulting in forty-seven thousand excess
deaths among children under five in the first eight months following the Gulf
W ar. 
,451
In 1991, Martti Ahtisaari, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for
Administration and Management, concluded that the Gulf War had "near-
apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure," that "most means of
modem life support ha[d] been destroyed or rendered tenuous" and that Iraq
had been "relegated to a pre-industrial age."452 Chris af Jochnick and Roger
Normand observe that Hiroshima had been bombed in order to propel the
Japanese to surrender.5 3 In contrast, they contend that the attack on Iraq was
unrelated to military objectives and was instead designed to create a weak-
ened and dependent postwar environment that would not tolerate the regime
of Saddam Hussein. 54
The Department of Defense responded to charges of indiscriminate and
intentional targeting of civilians and the civilian infrastructure in a 1992 re-
power. Kelly, supra note 432, at 54. The interruption of agriculture and transportation led to
famine and starvation. CLARK 1I, supra note 436, at 75.
446. af Jochnick & Normand, supra note 422, at 404.
447. Id. The military possessed "mobile stand-by generators and a buried fiber-optics
network." Id. at 405.
448. Id. at 406.
449. Id.
450. Kelly, supra note 432, at 53-54.
451. af Jochnick & Normand, supra note 422, at 401.
452. Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the
Immediate Post-Crisis Environment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari,
Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/1991/22366 (1991), reprinted in CLARK 1, supra note 427, at 236, 238.
453. af Jochnick & Normand, supra note 422, at 409-10.
454. Id. at 410-12. The authors observe that this may be a testimony to the weakness of
the military regime regulating aerial warfare. Id. "The Pentagon has admitted it targeted civil-
ian structures both to demoralize the populace and exacerbate the effects of sanctions. Many
attacks were carried out in daytime, when Iraqi civilians would undoubtedly be present."
CLARK 1I, supra note 436, at 69.
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port on the Gulf War.455 The document noted that the Office of General
Counsel of the Department of Defense provided advice to decision-makers
on a range of issues, including humanitarian law.4 6 The report emphasized
that target lists were examined to ensure consistency with American obliga-
tions under international law. 57 This process ensured that the United States
discriminated in target selection between combatants and noncombatants,
and between legitimate military targets and civilian objects. '58 The Ameri-
cans also matched available weapons systems to selected targets in order to
limit damage to military objects. 59
The report stated that the United States adhered to the principle of pro-
portionality and avoided military action in instances where the collateral
damage to civilians outweighed the military advantage.4" This balancing, ac-
cording to the Department of Defense, may be undertaken on a target by tar-
get basis, or may be evaluated in light of the objectives of the campaign. 6
The report claimed that steps were taken to minimize the risk of injury to
noncombatants. 6 ' Attacks on targets situated within populated areas were
carried out with weapons systems possessing the "greatest possible accu-
racy" and posing the "least risk" to civilian objects and population.65 Air-
crews were advised to refrain from attack in those instances in which a posi-
tive identification of targets was lacking." The Department of Defense
concluded that despite the "most discriminate air campaign in history, in-
cluding extraordinary measures by Coalition aircrews to minimize collateral
civilian casualties, the Coalition could not avoid causing some collateral
damage and injury." 65
The Pentagon report provided various explanations for these collateral
civilian casualties, injuries and damage."6 The document noted that objects
intended for civilian use also typically were employed for military purposes
in a modem society.467 A bridge, highway or railroad might have possessed
both civilian and military import.46 8 An electrical grid may be relied upon to
455. See United States: Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Conduct of
the Persian Gulf War-Appendix on the Role of the Law of War (Apr. 19, 1992), reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 612 (1992) [hereinafter Department of Defense].
456. Id. at 627.
457. Id. at 622.
458. Id. at 621.
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power both civilian and military communication systems and industries. '69
Iraq, according to the Pentagon, used civilian utilities to support the military
and armaments industry and usually located these facilities in residential ar-
eas.47 Coalition attacks on these sites inevitably placed civilians at risk, de-
spite efforts to minimize the potential harm.' Bridges crossing the Euphra-
tes River contained multiple fiber-optic links that provided Saddam Hussein
with secure communication to his forces; civilians utilizing the bridges at the
time of the attack, unfortunately, were at risk. '72
Iraq, according to the Pentagon, also deliberately utilized civilian popu-
lations and objects as shields for soldiers, weapons and military equip-
ment. '73 Helicopters, for instance, were placed adjacent to mosques and
medical and cultural sites; a supply of missiles was discovered inside a
school and chemical bomb equipment was located in a sugar factory. 74 The
Pentagon Report contended that the Coalition was fully warranted, as a mat-
ter of law, in targeting vital military sites in civilian areas. 75 At the same
time, military targets in populated areas or adjacent to protected cultural sites
were not attacked in those instances in which the potential danger or damage
outweighed the potential military advantage. 76
Iraq, according to the Department of Defense, also painted a false and
distorted picture of indiscriminate bombing that "did not accurately reflect
the high degree of care exercised by the Coalition in attack of Iraqi tar-
gets." '477 The decimation attributed to American bombing, in fact, resulted
from Iraq's war with Iran, a prewar earthquake and as a consequence of
Iraq's deliberate dismantling and damaging of a mosque." Iraq, moreover,
invited noncombatant casualties by moving military objects into civilian ar-
eas and placing aircraft adjacent to significant historic and cultural sites. 9
This contravened its obligation to safeguard civilians and civilian sites
through the evacuation of civilians, separation of military objects from the
civilian population and the initiation of air raid precautions.48°
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. Objects utilized concurrently for civilian and military purposes may be subject to
attack in the event that there is a military advantage to be gained. Id. Destruction of the com-
munications system was essential to the crippling of the highly centralized Iraqi military. Id.
472. Id. at 623-24.




477. Id. Some of this damage was caused by Iraqi surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft
munitions. Id.
478. id. A bomb crater near the mosque resulted from an air strike directed against a
military target. Id.
479. Id. at 626.
480. Id. at 625.
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The Pentagon noted that while neither the United States nor Iraq was a
signatory to the 1977 Protocol, this instrument codified customary practice
in regards to the obligation of belligerents toward civilians, which was
"binding" on all Nation-States. 8 ' Iraq, instead of taking precautions, inten-
tionally placed civilians at risk. '82 The Pentagon stressed that the presence of
these noncombatants did not render a site immune from bombardment, so
long as the attacker exercised "reasonable precautions to minimize incidental
or collateral injury ... consistent with mission accomplishment and allow-
able risk to the attacking forces.""' 3 At the same time, the defending party
had to "exercise reasonable precautions" to separate the civilian population
and civilian objects from military sites and could not utilize civilian popula-
tions or objects to shield legitimate targets.8
The Department of Defense contended that the al-Amariyah bunker was
camouflaged and secured with barbed wire and armed guards, and consti-
tuted a legitimate target. '85 The unfortunate deaths of noncombatants resulted
from the fact that Coalition forces were unaware that the civilian families of
officers working in the bunker were permitted access during the evening
hours.486 Targeting decisions were necessarily made based on the assessment
of information "reasonably available" to decision-makers. 87 The fact that the
Iraqi regime improperly permitted civilian access to a military target made
this tragedy inevitable and unavoidable.488
The Pentagon thus attributed primary responsibility for civilian casual-
ties to Saddam Hussein's failure to separate civilian and military targets, and
to Saddam's deployment of civilians as human shields.4 8 The document ar-
gued that Iraq's shielding of military targets with civilians illustrated the
lack of realism of Article 51 of the Protocol, which provided that Iraq's vio-
lation of the Convention did not release the United States from the legal ob-
ligation to take prudent precautionary measures in regards to the civilian
population. 9° This placed primary legal responsibility on the Coalition, de-
spite the fact that it was Iraq that deployed noncombatants as a shield."' The
Department of Defense was also critical of the Protocol, which provided that
in instances of doubt whether an object normally dedicated to civilian pur-









489. See supra notes 466-76 and accompanying texts.
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be performing a civilian function. '92 This, according to the Pentagon, did not
reflect the customary requirements of the humanitarian law of war, and im-
properly shifted the burden to the party launching an attack, which typically
lacked full awareness of the facts and circumstances.493 An attacking bellig-
erent rarely possessed the requisite degree of certainty, and the Protocol en-
couraged defenders to integrate civilian and military functions. 94
In the case of the al-Amariyah bunker, Coalition forces possessed evi-
dence that this was utilized as a command and control center, but were un-
aware that the site also was being employed as a civilian bomb shelter.95 An
attack may have been withheld, had the American forces possessed knowl-
edge of the presence of civilians. 96 However, the Pentagon stressed without
explanation that Iraq was in violation of its obligations to separate civilian
and military sites and the Coalition was entitled as a matter of military ne-
cessity to launch an attack.497
The Report's concluding section noted that operations during the Gulf
War were carried out in accordance with the United States' historic adher-
ence to the humanitarian law of war. '98 The operations were conducted with
"exceptional care" to minimize collateral damage to the population and
property. '" At the same time, the Pentagon stressed that Iraqi violations of
the humanitarian law of war should be punished in order to deter future vio-
lators. "
In summary, critics of American military tactics and strategy during the
Gulf War alleged that the United States was intentionally targeting Iraqi ci-
vilians and the civilian infrastructure in order to lower morale, enhance de-
pendency on the West and encourage popular dissatisfaction with Saddam
Hussein."' Much of the bombing necessarily was indiscriminate, given the
Coalition's reliance on high-altitude B-52 bombers. 2 Nevertheless, the Pen-
tagon contended that extraordinary care was taken to ensure adherence to the
humanitarian law of war. 3 According to the Department of Defense, the col-
lateral damage to civilians, for the most part, resulted from Iraq's placement
of military sites in population centers and utilization of civilians as human
492. Id. discussing Protocol 1, supra note 10, art. 52(3).
493. Id. This, according to the Pentagon Report, demands a degree of certainty from an
attacker that rarely exists in combat and encourages a defender to ignore the obligation to
separate the civilian population. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 627.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 644.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. See supra notes 442-43 and accompanying texts.
502. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 490-94 and accompanying texts.
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shields."° American decision-makers, in the end, questioned the Geneva Pro-
tocol's imposition of the burden of care on the attacking military rather than
on the belligerent with command and control over the targeted sites.5"
The legality of American aerial policy was challenged in the court-
martial of Army Reserve Captain Huet-Vaughn °6 In August 1991, Huet-
Vaughn was convicted of "desertion with the intent to avoid hazardous duty"
and vital national service; she was sentenced to dismissal from the military,
confinement for thirty months and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. 7 In
December 1991, the convening military authority reduced the period of con-
finement to fifteen months. 8 The Court of Military Review held that the
trial judge committed prejudicial error when he granted the government's
motion in limine to restrict Huet-Vaughn from testifying and presenting evi-
dence concerning her motive, which she contended was relevant to the ele-
ment of specific intent."° This excluded evidence pertaining to the fact that
Huet-Vaughn's desertion "was not based on a specific intent to avoid haz-
ardous duty and to shirk important service"; her intent was to expose the
criminal nature of the impending Persian Gulf War to the public.'
Huet-Vaughn, despite the judge's ruling, had been permitted to testify at
trial that she was a physician and anti-nuclear and social activist, whose re-
serve unit was assigned to participate in the Operation Desert Shield."' After
much personal reflection and reading, Huet-Vaughn testified that she con-
cluded participation in the Gulf War, with the impending utilization of
weapons of mass destruction that likely would likely cause thousands of
civilian deaths, violated her oath as a physician and officer."' She testified
that upon receiving her orders to report to the Persian Gulf, she deserted the
armed services and traveled to the United Nations, the United States Con-
gress, media organizations and anti-war rallies in order to educate the public
and to build opposition to the war. 3 She stated that this public purpose,
rather than a desire to avoid hazardous duty, motivated her to desert the mili-
tary.5
14
504. See supra notes 466-76 and accompanying texts.
505. See supra notes 490-94 and accompanying texts.
506. United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 39 M.J. 545 (ACMR 1994), 43 M.J. 105 (1995).
507. 39 M.J. at 547.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 548.
510. Id. at 549. Huet-Vaughn also unsuccessfully attempted to introduce evidence of her
good-faith belief that war crimes would be committed during Operation Desert Shield and
that she reasonably believed she was authorized under the Nuremberg Principles and applica-
ble United States law to refuse to participate in the conflict. Id. She further contended, "her
testimony and the testimonies of her witnesses were relevant to the defense of mistake of
law." Id.
511. 43 M.J. at 109.
512. Id. at 108-10.
513. /d. at 109-11.
514. Id. at 112.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed the
ruling of the Court of Military Review and determined that the trial judge
properly ruled that evidence pertaining to Huet-Vaughn's motivation was ir-
relevant as to whether she quit her unit with the intent to avoid hazardous
duty or to shirk important service. 5 The Court accordingly set aside the de-
cision of the United States Army Court of Military Review." 6 The Appellate
Court went on to observe that the evidence of Captain Huet-Vaughn's testi-
mony at trial pertaining to her conscientious opposition to the Gulf War "did
not negate her intent to avoid deploying to the Persian Gulf. To the contrary,
it tended to prove that she intended to avoid deployment by showing that she
was opposed to the war on moral and humanitarian grounds."5"7 The Court of
Appeals thus affirmed the exclusion of testimony pertaining to American ae-
rial attacks from trial.
XI. Kosovo
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Operation
Allied Force, on March 24, 1999, in what would prove to be a successful ef-
fort to halt Serbia's ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo province."' NATO re-
ported that by early July, 37,465 sorties had been launched against nine hun-
dred targets and that thirty-five percent of the twenty-six thousand weapons
employed were so-called "smart" or guided bombs." 9
NATO and the United States portrayed this as an accurate and well-
coordinated campaign. ' In September 1999, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen proclaimed, "[o]f the thousands of bombs that were dropped and the
missiles that were fired, nearly all of them hit their intended target. Of all
those thousands of weapons that were dropped and expended, approximately
20 had unintended consequences or were not on target."52 ' General Wesley
Clark, commander of NATO forces in the war, in October 1999, stated, "I
just want to emphasize the incredible precision of the bombing; the fact that
on 78 days, with over 23,000 weapons dropped or fired, there were only 20
incidents of collateral damage ... that's an incident rate of less than 1/10 of
1 percent.
'5 2
515. Id. at 113.
516. Id. at 116.
517. Id.
518. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN 1 (Feb.
2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-O 1 .htm (last visited June
14, 2002). Thirteen of the nineteen NATO nations deployed aircraft in the campaign: Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Id. at 1-2.
519. Id. at 3.
520. Id.
521. Quoted in id. at 5.
522. Quoted in id.
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The non-governmental organization .Human Rights Watch found ninety
incidents in which civilians were killed and concluded that as few as 489,
and as many as 528, Yugoslav noncombatants were killed in the bombing
campaign. 23 Between 303 and 352 deaths were due to twelve such inci-
dents. 24 These twelve were the only occurrences in which ten or more civil-
ian deaths were confirmed.'2'
In evaluating the international legality of the NATO bombing campaign,
Human Rights Watch utilized the relevant standards set forth in Protocol I,
which have been recognized by the United States as part and parcel of cus-
tomary international law.126 The evaluation was guided by the principle of
discrimination, which limits bombardment to military targets; 527 and by the
standard of proportionality, which mandates that the concrete military
advantage of an attack must outweigh the resulting civilian casualties and
that, in any event, an attack may not cause excessive civilian casualties or
damage.5 8 The principles of discrimination and proportionality require that
all feasible precautions should be undertaken to collect accurate information
concerning the prospective target. 29 Human Rights Watch suggested that
NATO's determination to avoid casualties among pilots and ground forces
led to a reliance on inherently inaccurate high-altitude bombing missions,
which were not aided by observers on the ground. 3 °
Human Rights Watch paid particular attention to several bombing at-
tacks emblematic of NATO's bombing campaign. 31 On April 14, 1999,
NATO aircraft conducted repeated bombings of a twelve-mile section of a
road connecting Djakovica and Decane in western Kosovo, killing roughly
seventy-three civilians and injuring thirty-six. 32 Human Rights Watch ar-
gued that NATO statements and modifications in policies seemed to consti-
tute a concession that sufficient precautions had not been taken to ensure ci-
vilians were not targeted during attacks on military vehicles."3
On May 13, 1999, roughly eighty-seven displaced Kosovar civilians
were killed and sixty were wounded by bombs targeting the village of Korisa
in Kosovo.'34 Human Rights Watch determined that Korisa was a legitimate
523. Id. at 4.
524. Id.
525. Id. The Yugoslav regime estimated civilian casualties at between one thousand two
hundred and five thousand seven hundred civilians. Id. at 5. NATO's figures indicated one
thousand five hundred civilians were killed. id at 6.
526. Id. at 7.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 8.
529. Id. at 9.
530. Id. Human Rights Watch noted that Yugoslavia had put noncombatants at risk on
several occasions and shared responsibility in these instances with NATO. Id.
531. Seeid.atll-16.
532. Id. at 11.
533. Id. at 11-12.
534. Id. at 12.
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military camp and command post that housed artillery. 35 Eyewitnesses re-
ported that the Serb forces illegally utilized the refugees as human shields. 36
At the same time, Human Rights Watch noted that violations of the law of
war did not release an adversary from the obligation to respect civilian im-
munity. 37 There was no indication that NATO selected this target with
knowledge that hundreds of displaced civilians were present. 38 Nevertheless,
Human Rights Watch concluded the excessive civilian death toll suggested
that NATO failed to ensure there were no civilians present at Korisa." 9
NATO also bombed a military base adjacent to the Dubrava peniten-
tiary." Human Rights Watch concluded that the Coalition forces, once
again, did not take adequate precautions.4
The most controversial attack was directed against Serb Radio and
Television (RTS) headquarters in Belgrade on April 23, 1999.542 Human
Rights Watch questioned whether the facility was being utilized to incite
violence and contended that, at most, the station was issuing propaganda
supportive of the war.43 Warnings had been issued to Western journalists
utilizing the facility who, in turn, alerted their Serbian colleagues.'" How-
ever, a lengthy period had passed and the Serbs presumably no longer feared
an attack;545 sixteen RTS technicians and workers were killed and sixteen
were wounded in the attack. 46
Human Rights Watch concluded that the attack on the station might
have demoralized the population and reduced government support, but this
did not offer a concrete and direct military advantage and transform the sta-
tion into a legitimate military target.4 Attacking the urban studios, rather
than the transmitters, served little purpose because the broadcasters were
able to easily shift operations. 48 In addition, the risks of attacking this urban
target outweighed any measurable military benefit. 9
NATO also confirmed seven definite and five possible deployments of
cluster bombs.5 An attack on the Nis airfield killed fourteen civilians and
535. Id.




540. Id. at 13-14.








549. Id. NATO failed to issue the required advance warning of the attacks, as required by
Article 57(2) of Protocol 1. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 57(2).
550. Id. at 15-16.
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injured twenty-eight when the bomb malfunctioned and bomblets sprayed
across the city.5 Following this incident, the United States restricted the use
of cluster bombs. 52
Carla del Ponte, prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), convened a committee to determine whether
charges should be brought against the NATO officials who planned, directed
or carried out the bombing campaign . 53 The Committee focused its discus-
sion on NATO's target selection.5
The Committee accepted that roughly five hundred civilians had been
killed during the bombing campaign. 55 These casualty figures were surpris-
ingly modest, in light of the fact that the Coalition dropped 23,614 air muni-
tions 6 This data, according to the Committee, failed to indicate that
"NATO may have conducted a campaign aimed at causing substantial civil-
ian casualties either directly or incidentally." '557 The Committee determined
that NATO attacked "legitimate military objectives," and that there was
"nothing inherently unlawful" about flying above the height subject to attack
by air defenses. 5 58 Despite the fifteen thousand feet minimum altitude speci-
fied by NATO, target identification generally proved accurate. 9
Several incidents proved particularly problematic, but were not deemed
to require further investigation."6 In each instance, the Committee concluded
that the law was not "sufficiently clear," or investigations were "unlikely to
result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges
against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous
551. Id. at 16.
552. Id.
553. FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW
TE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (2000),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato06l3OO.htm [hereinafter NATO] (last vis-
ited June 14, 2002). The threshold test as to whether to investigate an incident was whether
"credible evidence tending to show that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may
have been committed in Kosovo." Id. para. 5 (quoting Request by Prosecutor, Pursuant to
Rule 7). The Committee initially disposed of the issue of NATO's contravention of environ-
mental standards in warfare. See id. paras. 14-24. The relevant standards are set forth in Pro-
tocol I. Protocol I, supra note 10, arts. 35(3), 55. There also was no prohibition on the em-
ployment of depleted uranium projectiles. NATO, supra, para. 26. The Committee also noted
that there was no specific treaty provision prohibiting or restricting the use of cluster bombs,
however, they must be employed in accordance with general principles regulating weapons.
id. para. 27.
554. See NATO, supra note 553, paras. 28-56. "It is difficult to describe the fire bomb-
ing of Hamburg, Dresden and Tokyo as anything other than attacks intended to kill, terrorize
or demoralize civilians. Whether or not these attacks could be justified legally in the total war
context of the time, they would be unlawful if they were required to comply with Protocol I."
Id. para. 43.
555. Id. para. 53.
556. Id. para. 54.
557. Id.
558. Id. paras. 55-56.
559. Id. para. 56.
560. Id. para. 57.
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offenses.""56 The first involved an April 1999 laser guided bomb attack,
which hit a five-carriage passenger train crossing the Leskovac railway
bridge over the Grdelica gorge and Juzna Morava river in eastern Serbia.
Ten people were killed and fifteen injured in this assault, which NATO
claimed was directed at the bridge serving as a re-supply route for Serb
forces in Kosovo.56 The Committee affirmed that the bridge was the object
of the attack, and that the train had not been visible to the pilot or weapons
officer, who were many miles from the attack site and relied on a five-inch
radar screen in making the rapid decision to fire.5" The train only was visible
following the release of the bomb.565 The Committee differed on the propri-
ety of launching the second bomb attack.66
Another incident involved the attack on the Djakovica convoy on April
14, 1999, which resulted in between seventy and seventy-five people killed
and roughly one hundred injured. 67 NATO pilots, flying at fifteen thousand
feet or higher and relying on unaided visual identification, attacked two ve-
hicle convoys, both of which, unknown to the pilots, included civilian vehi-
cles. 68 The attack was directed against Serb military forces conducting eth-
nic cleansing operations and burning houses along the road between Prizren
and Djakovica 69 The F-16 attack aircraft were flying at several hundred
miles an hour at an advanced altitude and halted their attack when it was dis-
covered that civilians had been targeted. 7 °
The Committee then turned its attention to the bombing of the RTS
broadcasting headquarters, which resulted in the death of roughly seventeen
people.57 ' As noted, NATO justified the attack based on the dual civilian and
military use of the communications system. 7 In addition to the attack on
RTS, radio relay buildings and towers were hit along with electrical power
transformer stations in an effort to impede the Yugoslav military command
and control and air defense systems."7
561. Id. para. 90.
562. Id. para. 58.
563. Id.
564. Id. paras. 59-61.
565. Id. para. 61.
566. Id. para. 62.
567. Id. para. 63.
568. Id. para. 64.
569. Id.
570. Id. para. 69. "While this incident is one where it appears the aircrews could have
benefitted from lower altitude scrutiny of the target at an early stage, the committee is of the
opinion that neither the aircrew nor their commanders displayed the degree of recklessness in
failing to take precautionary measures which would sustain criminal charges." Id. para. 70.
571. Id. para. 71.
572. Id. paras. 72-74.
573. Id.
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The Committee concluded that an attack based on a desire to limit
command, control and communications systems was "legally acceptable. 574
An assault aimed at disrupting the propaganda message of the Yugoslav re-
gime in order to undermine the morale of the population and armed forces,
however, would not satisfy the requirement that a target make an effective
contribution to a belligerent's military machine and result in a definite and
concrete military advantage. 75 There was no indication that the Yugoslav re-
gime's use of the station went beyond propaganda and incited popular vio-
lence 6
The Committee concluded that NATO's targeting of the RTS building
in order to prevent propaganda was secondary to the desire to disable the
Serbian military command and control system. 77 The station thus was a "le-
gitimate objective," and while "the civilian casualties were unfortunately
high" they did "not appear to be clearly disproportionate." 78 Some members
of the investigative group believed that NATO failed to make "every possi-
ble effort to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage. 5 79 However, the
majority pointed out that because foreign media representatives were warned
of an attack, Yugoslav officials might have had similar knowledge of attack
warnings. 8° The Committee noted that while NATO possessed a continuing
duty to warn civilians of the attack, "the advance notice given by NATO
may have in fact been sufficient under the circumstances" and that Yugoslav
authorities remained "partially responsible for the civilian casualties." 581
The most visible error in targeting occurred on July 5, 1999, when mis-
siles launched from NATO aircraft hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade,
killing three Chinese citizens, injuring fifteen others and causing substantial
damage. 8 The embassy was incorrectly identified as the Yugoslav Federal
Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP), a legitimate military tar-
get.' The error resulted from a Central Intelligence Agency officer's reli-
ance on faulty target identification techniques that were unquestioningly ac-
cepted by senior military personnel. 84 The United States subsequently issued
574. Id. para. 75.
575. Id. para. 76.
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Id. para. 77.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Id. The RTS building was a legitimate military target and the issue remained
whether the civilian casualties were disproportionate to the military advantage. Id. para. 75.
The Committee adopted a contextual approach and concluded NATO was aware that several
strikes would be required to disable the intricate and complex command and control network.
Id. para. 78. Other targets included transmission towers and control buildings of the Yugosla-
via radio relay network, both of which were essential to the direction and control of the army
and special forces in Kosovo and were central in the Yugoslav air defense network. Id.
582. Id. para. 80.
583. Id.
584. Id. paras. 81-83.
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a formal apology for targeting an illegitimate site and agreed to pay compen-
sation to both the Chinese government and the families of individuals killed
or injured.58 The Committee declined to undertake an investigation, conclud-
ing the aircrew should not be assigned responsibility because they had been
ordered to attack the "wrong target." '586 Senior military leaders also relied in
good faith on faulty information that had been provided by officials of an-
other agency."'
The Committee also determined that it would not investigate the cir-
cumstances surrounding the dropping of ten bombs on the village of Korisa
on May 14, 1999, which resulted in the killing of as many as eighty-seven
civilians and the wounding of sixty. 88 NATO, in contrast to other incidents,
did not concede that there had been a targeting error and insisted that intelli-
gence indicated a Serbian military camp and command post was located
nearby to the village. 89 The pilot was able to identify silhouettes of military
vehicles on the ground immediately prior to dropping ten laser guided and
gravity bombs and was unaware of the presence of civilians. 9 The Commit-
tee noted that there was some indication that Kosovar civilians were utilized
as human shields and Yugoslav forces may have been partially responsible
for the deaths. 9 ' The final report concluded there was a lack of "credible in-
formation" to determine whether a crime had been committed by the aircrew
or by the NATO chain of command.59
The failure of the prosecutor for the ICTY to pursue prosecutions of
NATO officials and airmen compounded the earlier refusal of the ICJ to is-
sue provisional measures to halt the bombing of Yugoslavia.595 Yugoslavia
contended that Belgium and other NATO members were engaged in geno-
cide that entailed the pollution of the environment, destruction of the econ-
omy and extermination of the population. 9 The ICJ, however, declined to
exercise jurisdiction and determined that the essential characteristic of geno-
cide was lacking: the intentional destruction of a national, ethnical, racial or
585. Id. para. 84.
586. Id. para. 85.
587. Id.
588. Id. paras. 86, 89.
589. Id. para. 86.
590. Id. para. 87.
591. Id. para. 88.
592. Id. para. 89.
593. See Legality of the Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 105 (Order of June 2,
1999), available at http:/www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketliybe/iybeorders/iybeiorder_
19990602.htm. Yugoslavia filed requests for provisional measures against Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United
States. See Peter H. F. Bekker, International Decision: Legality of Use of Force, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 928 (1999).
594. Legality of the Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 105, para. 35 (Order of
June 2, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeorders/iybe ior-
der_19990602.htm.
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religions group. 95 The Court stressed that "the threat or use of force against a
State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Ar-
ticle II of the Genocide Convention.
'596
In summary, Human Rights Watch attributed NATO's faulty targeting
to a combination of indiscriminate bombing and intelligence failures. 97 The
investigative committee appointed by the ICTY, however, stressed that
NATO acted in a prudent and responsible fashion in light of the speed, fluid-
ity, complexity and uncertainty of the Kosovo campaign. 98 These differing
interpretations seemed to reflect the inherent uncertainty of the legal obliga-
tions to "do everything feasible" to verify that targets are neither civilians
nor civilian objects;5 9  to "take all feasible precautions" to minimize the inci-
dental loss of civilian life;' to refrain from attacks that "may be expected to
cause incidental loss of life;" 1 and to select a military objective that may be
"expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian ob-
jects."' 2 Commentators are left to evaluate the targeting of the railway
bridge, civilian vehicles and Chinese embassy in light of these standards,
and to better define the scope of permissible military targets, particularly in
regards to dual-use facilities."°
The Statute of the newly established international court significantly
limited the scope of liability under the Protocol by adopting a stringent spe-
cific intent standard in regards to the targeting of civilians,' civilian ob-
jects" and clearly excessive incidental injury or loss of life. 6 This seems to
ease the burden of investigation and precaution placed upon belligerents de-
ploying armed aircraft, and only encompasses the most certain and con-
spicuous criminal conduct.: 7
The Kosovo campaign was the culmination of the trend towards "virtual
war" in which militarily sophisticated Western regimes relied on precision
bombing and high technology to intervene in industrializing and militarily
weak territories to protect human rights.: 8 The aim of the Kosovo campaign
was to conduct a casualty-free campaign based on strict legal constraints in
595. Id. para. 40.
596. Id.
597. See supra notes 523-52 and accompanying texts.
598. See supra notes 553-96 and accompanying texts.
599. Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
600. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
601. Id. art. 57(2)(b).
602. Id. art. 57(3).
603. See supra notes 387-95 and accompanying texts.
604. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 8(2)(b)(i),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
605. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ii).
606. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
607. See supra notes 396-400 and accompanying texts.
608. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR: Kosovo AND BEYOND 3-5 (2000).
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targeting.6' The focus on disrupting Yugoslavia's domestic military's com-
mand, control and communication systems, however, typically required ur-
ban attacks on dual-use facilities that inevitably resulted in unintentional and
unavoidable civilian injuries and deaths. 6"° Noncombatant casualties also re-
sulted from the reliance on air power to interdict and confront combatants
rather than risk the loss and expense of inserting ground troops.6" These
types of casualties drew attention precisely because they belied the claim
that the air campaign was conducted in a clean and antiseptic fashion. 61 '2 At
the same time, public knowledge and awareness of the consequences and
contours of combat was limited to press reports, which inevitably were
skeletal in a war primarily fought through distant technological targeting. 6"3
This "virtual war" proved to be the paradigm pursued by American forces in
Afghanistan.
XII. AFGHANISTAN
The United States attack on Afghanistan constituted an unprecedented
technological assault." ' American aerial forces relied on intelligence from
Predator drones equipped with Hellfire antitank missiles, which instantane-
ously relayed battlefield video to AC-130 gunships, Global Hawk unmanned
reconnaissance surveillance drones, U-2 spy planes, RC-135 Rivet Joint
electronic eavesdropping vehicles and land-based special operatives
equipped with communications devices, range finders and lasers that di-
rected bombs to the targets.6"5 The most innovative development was the
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which attached to the tail of a con-
ventional bomb and then directed the munition to a target utilizing continu-
ous position updates from satellites in orbit.6 6 A similar device was devel-
oped for cluster bombs, a container that upon explosion emitted hundreds of
small and lethal bomblets across a vast area. 617 The Wind Corrected Muni-
609. See id. at 101, 186, 200.
610. See id. at 108, 170.
611. Seeid. at 174-76.
612. See id. at 166, 170.
613. See id. at 191-96.
614. See Eric Schmitt, Improved U.S. Accuracy Claimed in Afghan Air War, N.Y. TiMES,
Apr. 9, 2002, at A 16.
615. See Eric Schmitt & James Dao, Use of Pinpoint Air Power Comes of Age in New
War, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at Al.
616. Id. Testing has shown that the JDAM typically falls within thirteen yards of its tar-
get. Id. The JDAM also has an internal navigation system that can be programmed with target
coordinates from the launching aircraft; this usually lands within thirty yards of the target. Id.
Over four thousand two hundred JDAM's were dropped, roughly one-third of the munitions
utilized in the war. Id. The accuracy of so-called "dumb" bombs has "improved with more
accurate airplane radars and better computers that gauge the ballistics of weapons." Schmitt,
supra note 614.
617. Schmitt & Dao, supra note 615.
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tions Dispenser prevented these weapons from being blown-off course and
purportedly guided the cluster container within thirty feet of the target."8
American commanders in Saudi Arabia collected and integrated this in-
telligence information and coordinated attacks utilizing these component in-
telligence parts."9 This information was used to determine which aircraft to
dispatch, the type and size of bombs to use, as well as the best approach
route.62 Lawyers reviewed the targets and evaluated the risk to civilians.621
Between October 2001 and April 2002, more than twenty-two thousand
bombs and missiles were dropped in Afghanistan, which was similar to the
total dropped in Serbia and roughly one-tenth of the number deployed in the
Persian Gulf.622 In Afghanistan, roughly sixty percent of the munitions were
guided to their targets by lasers or satellites.623 The figure for Serbia was
thirty-five percent and eight percent for the Persian Gulf War.2 Military of-
ficials claimed, in aggregate, that roughly seventy-five percent of the bombs
and missiles hit their target; an analysis of Naval and Marine Corps aircraft
placed the effectiveness of the bombing at between seventy-five and eighty
percent." The rate during the Gulf War and in Serbia reportedly was forty-
five to fifty percent.626 This nevertheless meant that a significant number of
bombs in Afghanistan missed their target and may have caused unanticipated
and unknown injury and property damage.627 Still, the commander of United
States forces in Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, characterized the Af-
ghan campaign as the most "accurate war fought in this nation's history." '28
This infatuation with technological advance led defense analyst Philip S.
Meilinger to write that air-launched munitions were the most humane and
least damaging element in the modem military arsenal.629
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other military men consis-
tently claimed the American bombardment generally was accurate and re-
sulted in limited collateral damage.63 Secretary Rumsfeld, however, con-




621. Barry Bearak, Eric Schmitt & Craig S. Smith, Uncertain Toll in the Fog of War:
Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2002, at Al.
622. Schmitt, supra note 614.
623. Id. These weapons purportedly were ninety percent accurate. Id. This meant fewer





628. Bearak, Schmitt & Smith, supra note 621.
629. Philip S. Meilinger, A Matter of Precision, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar.-Apr., 2001, at 78,
78-79.
630. Bearak, Schmitt & Smith, supra note 621.
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killed and that is always unfortunate."63' He observed that it was "next to im-
possible" to calculate civilian casualties, given the lack of access to target
sites, passage of time and the Islamic tradition of rapidly burying bodies and
repairing property damage.632 The American military, of course, was reluc-
tant to concede that the bombing campaign might have resulted in civilian
deaths.633 Researchers placed the number of deaths, three months into the air
campaign, at between roughly one and four thousand.634 The head of Af-
ghanistan's interim government, Hamid Karzi, strongly supported American
action in Afghanistan, but cautioned, "we must also make sure our civilians
do not suffer.""63 Zalmay Khalizad, United States special envoy to Afghani-
stan, regretted that civilians unintentionally had been targeted and placed re-
sponsibility on Al Qaeda and the Taliban for initiating the conflict.636
In October 2001, the Department of State issued a fact sheet on the
avoidance of civilian casualties.637 The document claimed that the United
States was taking "extraordinary measures to avoid civilian casualties" and
was only targeting "military and terrorist sites.""63 At the same time,. the fact
sheet conceded that weapons and munitions could not be one hundred per-
cent accurate; there had been civilian casualties for which the United States
had apologized and, despite good faith efforts, could not be "entirely
avoided." '639 The utilization of precision weapons, however, limited the ex-
tent and scope of civilian injury. '
A study of civilian casualties by the New York Times questioned the
claims of the Department of State and reported that America's "high-tech,
out-of-harm's-way strategy" in Afghanistan had "produced a pattern of mis-
631. Id.
632. Id. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in February, admitted United States forces mis-
takenly might have targeted innocent Afghans, believing they were hostile forces. See Eric
Schmitt, Error Possible in Attacks, Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A13.
633. See Bearak, Schmitt & Smith, supra note 621 (quoting William H. Arkin, former
Army intelligence analyst and military adviser to Human Rights Watch).
634. Id. Professor Marc W. Herold, an economist at the University of New Hampshire,
calculated at least 3,767 civilian casualties from October 7 to December 6, 2001. Id. Carl
Conetta, co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, adopted a more critical stance and
placed the figure at between one thousand and one thousand three hundred deaths. Id.
635. Amy Waldman, Afghan Leader Warily Backs U.S. Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2002, at Al. See also Henri E. Cauvin, In Statement, Mandela Shifts on All-Out Support for
War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2002, at A13.
636. Mark Landler, Bombing Necessary Despite Toll on Civilians, U.S. Envoy Says, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 9, 2002, at A11.
637. U.S. Department of State, Office of International Information Programs, FACT
SHEET: U.S. MILITARY EFFORTS TO Avon) CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (Oct. 25, 2001), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/OI102503.htm (last visited June 14, 2002).
638. Id.
639. Id.
640. Id. These weapons are calibrated to the nature of the target and to the risk of civilian
casualties. Id.
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takes" that "killed hundreds of Afghan civilians." 1 On-site reviews of
eleven locations where air strikes killed as many as four hundred civilians
indicated that American commanders, on various occasions, relied on mis-
taken, incomplete, inaccurate and intentionally misleading information pro-
vided by locale Afghans harboring vendettas. ' The United States' aversion
to ground operations prevented the verification of this often faulty informa-
tion.6" A number of incidents in Afghanistan raised doubts concerning the
United States' claim that civilians had not been injured in the American
bombing campaign. ,
In October 2001, American planes attacked a military base and police
station in Tirin Kot, a Taliban occupied area in southern Afghanistan, hitting
a tractor-trailer and killing the driver, seventeen children and three women."
Relatives carried the wounded to a house that, in turn, was bombed, killing
most of the wounded and injuring those who intervened to offer assistance. 6
The United States claimed precision-guided munitions were utilized and
there was no evidence of civilian casualties.6" There also was an attack on
the village of Karam, in eastern Afghanistan, resulting in an unknown num-
ber of civilian casualties. 8
In November 2001, Amy Waldman reported on a cluster bomb attack,
which killed twelve noncombatants in a village in the Ghor Province." 9 She
interviewed a twenty-five year old Afghan whose father and three uncles
died in the assault.65 The young man now found himself responsible for sup-
641. See Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead, N.Y.
TMEs, July 21, 2002, at Al.
642. Id.
643. Id. This mistaken targeting strained relations between the United States and the in-
digenous Afghan population. Id.
644. See Thorn Shanker, Rumsfeld Calls Civilian Deaths Relatively Low, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2002, at A9. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld disputed the study's conclusions
and contended there were fewer civilian casualties than "perhaps any war in modem history,"
and the Coalition forces "have gone to extraordinary lengths not only to avoid civilian deaths
but to save civilian lives." Id. Secretary Rumsfeld stated that he knew of "no instance" in
which a local Afghan leader provided false information to American forces in order to elimi-
nate opposition figures and groups. Id. The Taliban, of course, were notorious for atrocities.
See Carlotta Gall, Killings From Taliban's Era Still Haunt a Valley, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2002, at Al.
645. See Carlotta Gall, October Strike on Taliban Hit Civilians, Survivors Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at Al.
646. Id.
647. Id.
648. See Barry Bearak, U.S. Raid Kills Unknown Number in an Afghan Village, N.Y.
TINMEs, Oct. 13, 2001, at B1.
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porting the family.651 Another victim lost his leg and eyesight and his face
was disfigured. 2
The unexploded remnants of the cluster bomb were scattered proximate
to the village and were the same color as food packages dropped by the
United States. 53 Amy Waldman recounted one young man who innocently
picked up a bomblet, lost three fingers and confronted the amputation of his
hand.654 A second youth was decapitated when a bomblet exploded. 655 The
non-governmental organization, Doctors Without Borders, reported civilian
deaths in the area were "unacceptably high," counting eighty dead and fifty
wounded, including women and children.656 Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the
medical group's call for the United States to practice proportionality in the
utilization of armed force as suggesting a moral equivalence between Al
Qaeda, the Taliban and the United States.657 He contended that there was
consistent planning to ensure that only military sites were targeted and
"there were no off-target hits, so there were no collateral damage worries in
this series of strikes. 656
American bombers also targeted the Tora Bora cave complex where
Osama bin Laden was suspected of hiding and hit three villages, killing over
seventy civilians.659 It was speculated that this may have resulted from misin-
formation provided by local Afghans to American forces." Afghan villagers
in the region accused the United States of killing more than one hundred
fifty civilians in six incidents, including an attack on a mosque. 661 Rear Ad-
miral Craig R. Quigley, chief spokesperson for the American Central Com-





655. Id. Cluster bomblets contribute to the large number of mines littering the country;
estimates range from six hundred and thirty-four thousand to twenty million. C.J. Chivers,
400 Demolition Experts Will Try to Harvest Afghanistan's Field of Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2001, at BI.
656. John H. Cushman Jr., War's Hidden Cost, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 9, 2001, § 4, at 14.
657. Id.
658. ld.
659. Tim Weiner, U.S. Bombs Hit 3 Towns, Afghans Say; Pentagon Denies It, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at B2.
660. Id.
661. John F. Burns, Villagers Say Errors by U.S. Causing Grief for Innocent, N.Y.
Tivms, Feb. 2, 2002, at A9. Civilians reportedly died in six different American attacks be-
tween November 15 and the beginning of February. Id. A villager in Zani Khel reportedly ex-
tended hospitality to an individual who later was identified as a Taliban commander fleeing
Kabul. Id. Several hours later a bomb struck the villager's compound, killing twenty people,
including his wife, three grandsons and six granddaughters. Id. The local warlord blamed ri-
vals who may have deliberately misled the Americans in an effort to destabilize the control-
ling clan. Id.
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whenever we have killed a single person" and that "there was no chance the
village was targeted improperly. 662
On December 20, 2001, in Paktia Province, American warplanes at-
tacked a convoy, killing up to fifty or sixty people. 63 The survivors scram-
bled towards two villages that also were targeted.6 The Pentagon contended
that the victims were Taliban leaders who fired at American planes. 65 The
survivors contended that the convoy was transporting tribal elders who had
been invited to Kabul for the inauguration of interim president Hamid
Karzi."6 There is evidence they were targeted by a regional warlord who was
seeking to eliminate individuals whom he viewed as opposed to his local
leadership.667
On February 4, 2002, a Predator drone operated by remote control fired
at least one antitank missile at a group of men near a former Al Qaeda train-
ing base, killing at least one.668 The Pentagon responded to claims that the
victims had been foraging for scrap metal by alleging there was a "mosaic"
of information indicating the men were engaged in "suspicious activities.' 9
There was speculation that one of the individuals was Osama bin Laden,
leader of Al Qaeda.67° However, reports subsequently indicated the men were
impoverished villagers who were scavenging metal in order to earn money. 7
In July 2002, American pilots responded to what officials claimed was
anti-aircraft fire and bombed four villages in southern Afghanistan.672 It later
was established that American, Afghan and coalition forces were conducting
662. Quoted in Weiner, supra note 659.
663. Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Says U.S. Airstrike Killed Women and Children, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at All.
664. Filkins, supra note 641.
665. Schmitt, supra note 663.
666. Id. The article discusses a March attack by American aircraft against a vehicle car-
rying suspected Al Qaeda. Id. In addition to adult males, it later was determined that women
and children had been killed. Id. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld argued that the noncombat-
ants were in the zone of battle as a matter "of their own free will." Id. The article also refer-
ences an October attack in which an errant bomb struck a building housing a United Nations
land mines removal mission, killing four individuals. Id. In the same month, a Red Cross
warehouse was attacked when the military neglected to remove the building from the target
list. Id. In another incident, incorrect coordinates were entered on a bombing mission, result-
ing in a two thousand pound satellite bomb hitting civilian houses rather than Kabul airport,
resulting in the death of four individuals. Id. The complex politics surrounding the attack on
the convoy is discussed in, Amy Waldman, Debate Over U.S. Raid on Convoy Exposes Fluid
Loyalties in Area Shaken by War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B3.
667. Filkins, supra note 641.
668. James Dao, U.S. Defends Missile Strike, Saying Attack was Justified, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2002, at A12.
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. See John F. Burns, U.S. Leapt before Looking, Angry Villagers Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2002, at A12.
672. Carlotta Gall, Hunt for Taliban Leaves Village with Horror, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2002, at Al.
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search and reconnaissance missions in the area and that the gunfire was from
people celebrating at an engagement party.673 The return fire from AC-130
aircraft resulted in forty-eight dead and one hundred seventeen injured; most
of the casualties were women and children.674 An American spokesperson
explained that the personnel on the aircraft believed they were under sus-
tained attack.675 The military later blamed faulty intelligence from an Afghan
seeking to advantage himself in a local power struggle.676
Despite the methodical process of target-selection, the United States
rapidly exhausted fixed target sites in Afghanistan and pilots were returning
without discharging their munitions.677 As early as mid-October, American
pilots were authorized to select their own targets and to fire without restraint
within areas thought to be under Taliban control.678 On one occasion, a Red
Cross warehouse a mile from the Kabul airport was mistakenly bombed.679
In April 2002, dozens of Afghan families who lost relatives as a result
of American bombings traveled to Kabul seeking compensation.68 Petitions
from four hundred families were transmitted to the American embassy by an
eight-year old girl, Amina, who lived with her father, the only other survivor
in her eighteen-person family.68 Nine-year old Abdul described being
blinded by shrapnel while a young couple recounted a cluster bomb attack
that killed their two children.682
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Carlotta Gall & Eric Schmitt, Shocked Afghans Criticize U.S. Strike; Toll is Some
40 Dead and 100 Wounded, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2002, at A3.
676. Gall, supra note 672. Afghan President Hamid Karzi summoned American military
officials to his office for an explanation. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Offers Karzai Sympathy on
Dead, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2002, at Al. President George Bush telephoned Hamid Karzi to
express his sympathies for the killing of innocents. Id. Dexter Filkins writes that the strategy
of attacking with overwhelming force on "questionable targets" began several months prior to
the July attack, when Americans attacked the village of Niazi Qala fifty miles south of Kabul,
killing fifty-two people. Filkins, supra note 641. The residents denied the village harbored
any members of the Taliban. Id.
677. See James Dao, The New Air War: Fewer Pilots, More Hits and Scarcer Targets,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B1.
678. Steven Lee Myers & Thom Shanker, Pilots Told to Fire at Will in Some Zones,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at B2.
679. Id.
680. Carlotta Gall, Shattered Afghan Families Demand U.S. Compensation, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2002, at All.
681. Id.
682. Id. Family members of Americans killed in the attack on the World Trade Towers
met with Afghans who lost relatives during United States bombing. See Mark Landler, Shar-
ing Grief to Find Understanding, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A4. Rita Lasar of New York
City, mourning the death of her brother, remarked to one Afghan that all those who died were
"collateral damage" of the conflict. Id. The Central Intelligence Agency, on at least one occa-
sion, paid the families of innocents one thousand dollars. John Kifner, A Question for Af-
ghanistan: Who's the Proxy Here?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 4, at 3.
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The United States, however, has consistently resisted conceding civil-
ians were directly targeted. 683 The initial American response was to catalogue
atrocities committed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban in order to shift attention
from the American bombing campaign.6" Despite occasional admissions and
apologies,68 ' the United States official stance was to dismiss allegations of
civilian casualties.8 6 In response to accusations that Northern Alliance troops
killed hundreds of Taliban fighters, Donald Rumsfeld intoned that people
making such allegations "have been absolutely lying through their teeth,
week after week after week, throughout the whole thing. 687 Secretary Rums-
feld resented the implication that "America is what's wrong with the world"
when it was the Taliban who have "done enormous humanitarian harm.
'68 8
He concluded with the familiar theme that the American campaign "will
prove to have been the change of hands with the least loss of life of any time
in modern memory in that country [in Afghanistan]."689 As the war wound
down, the media were able to more confidently traverse the country and
document civilian casualties. 69" These incidents typically were attributed to
misleading information provided by informants in a country in which Secre-
tary of Defense Rumsfeld explained, "people who are friendly and un-
friendly are constantly meeting together. Indeed, sometimes the same people
can be friendly and later unfriendly within a short period of time. There are
also people who pretend they're friendly and who, in fact, are not very
friendly, and who provide aid and comfort and assistance to the Taliban and
Al Qaeda that are still in the country.' 691
There was a strong sentiment that concern with civilian casualties un-
duly complicated and confounded the American military campaign.692 New
York Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof contended that despite the loss of
civilian life, the American intervention in Afghanistan was a supreme hu-
manitarian gesture.693 Kristof points out that under the Taliban two hundred
and twenty-five thousand children died before the age of five and fifteen
thousand women died during pregnancy or childbirth.694 These numbers
683. See Eric Schmitt, After January Raid, Gen. Franks Promises to Do Better, N.Y.
TJMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A14.
684. See Dana Milbank, U.S. Takes Offensive in Information War with List of Enemy
Crimes, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2001, at A38, available at http://www.washingtonpost.coml
ac2/wp-dyn/A776-200lNov21.
685. See supra note 631 and accompanying text.
686. See John F. Burns, P.OW. 's Were Shot; Question Is How Many?, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.




690. Kifner, supra note 682.
691. Id.
692. See Peter Steinfels, Beliefs; In the Heat of War, Confronting a Moral Principle of
Keeping Civilians Immune from Direct Attack, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 2002, at B6.
693. Nicholas D. Kristof, A Merciful War, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 1, 2002, at A25.
694. Id.
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likely would have escalated as international organizations retreated from Af-
ghanistan in response to the arrest of Christian aid workers.695 Following the
American intervention, there was a renewed multinational commitment that
resulted in seven hundred and thirty-four thousand children being vaccinated
against measles in a country where there had not been a single instance of a
child having been vaccinated in the previous ten years. 96 Kristof estimated
that as a result of the American intervention, mortality rates would drop by
fifty percent and over a million children would gain access to education.697
This calculus, however, is not a component of the positive humanitarian
law of war.699 As noted, the distinction between permissible military and im-
permissible civilian targets is the fundamental guiding principle of the law of
war.699 There is little support for the proposition that the United States or
coalition forces have intentionally targeted civilians."° However, there seems
to have been a failure to take every feasible measure to ensure that military
rather than civilian populations and objects were attacked.' Reliance on
high-altitude aerial bombardment, rather than ground forces, resulted in the
utilization of means or methods of attack which, when combined with faulty
intelligence, created an enhanced risk of the accidental and incidental civil-
ian injury and loss of life.7"2 The New York Times study indicated a number
of civilian deaths resulted from bombs hitting their intended target. 3 The fa-
talities resulted from faulty information, mistakes in target identification, the
utilization of excessive force and a rapid and rushed decision-making proc-
ess."' The burden rested on the relevant American officers and officials to
ensure information was accurate and to request additional information in the
event of doubt. 5
In summary, the noncombatant injuries and deaths in Afghanistan were
the inevitable result of a campaign relying on high technology to defeat an
opposing force that sought safety and security through integration into the
indigenous population.0 6 This civilian shield plainly contravened the obliga-
tion to avoid the exploitation and endangerment of innocents.7 However, in
the Hostage case, an American court clearly established the violation of the




698. See supra notes 363-410 and accompanying texts.
699. See supra notes 363-66 and accompanying texts.
700. See supra notes 641-44 and accompanying texts.
701. See supra notes 668-71 and accompanying texts.
702. See supra note 641 and accompanying text.
703. Filkins, supra note 641.
704. Id.
705. See supra notes 396-400 and accompanying texts.
706. See supra notes 641-44 and accompanying texts.
707. See supra notes 408-10 and accompanying texts.
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ence or necessity in combating indigenous forces:" 8 "If adequate troops were
not available or if the lawful measures against the population failed in their
purpose, the occupant could limit its operations or withdraw from the coun-
try in whole or in part, but no right existed to pursue a policy in violation of
international law. ' 7°
XIII. CONCLUSION
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the international
community experienced halting success in regulating the utilization of aerial
bombardment from balloons. 7"° Language in the 1907 Hague Convention
seemed to constrain the bombing of undefended cities and might be inter-
preted to limit attacks against civilians and civilian objects. 711 The intentional
targeting of civilians in aerial attacks during World War I suggested aircraft
were viewed as outside the parameters of the humanitarian law of war and
these attacks stood as a harbinger of the technology and tactics employed
during World War II."1
The 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare constituted a comprehensive,
but ultimately unsuccessful, effort to establish binding international stan-
dards for the regulation of aerial bombardment. The Convention did strongly
suggest that the basic principles of the humanitarian law of warfare were ap-
plicable to aircraft.7 " The principle provisions of the Hague Rules of Aerial
Warfare later were recognized as customary international law and invoked
by the League of Nations to condemn the aerial assaults launched by Spain
and China during the 1930s.7" The restrictions on air attacks in these interna-
tional documents were in conflict with the primordial philosophy of the
founding fathers of air-launched attacks.1 5
This sense of restraint was overcome, during World War II, by the exi-
gencies of the armed conflicts in Europe and Asia and degenerated into un-
bridled air attacks against urban areas.716 Prosecutions, however, were not
conducted against officers and airmen involved in aerial attacks.7 '17 In addi-
tion, language in the Einsatzgruppen case suggested that the incidental in-
jury and killing of civilians during an aerial attack was permissible under the
708. See United States v. Wilhelm List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NEURNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL CouNcIL LAW No. 10, 1230, 1273
(1950).
709. Id. at 1273.
710. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying texts.
711. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying texts.
712. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying texts.
713. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying texts.
714. See supra notes 114-31 and accompanying texts.
715. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying texts.
716. See supra notes 138-90 and accompanying texts.
717. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying texts.
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humanitarian law of war."' Some isolated prosecutions were brought before
military courts for the abuse of Allied airmen.7"9 Critics pointed to the failure
to explore the implications of the dropping of the atomic bomb as indicative
of the policy of selective prosecution and "victors' justice"' ° which ani-
mated these prosecutions."'
The United States waged unrestricted aerial warfare during the Vietnam
War. North Vietnam's planned prosecution of American airmen blatantly
contravened international due process standards. At the same time, the inter-
national criticism of the North Vietnamese was indicative of the acceptance
of unbridled aerial warfare as lawful under international law. 2
In 1977, the United States issued a manual on the conduct of air war-
fare, which recognized that aerial tactics and strategies were constrained by
the general principles of the humanitarian law of war.72 3 This was clarified
and elaborated in the 1977 Geneva Protocol, which recognized that air cam-
paigns were subject to the principles of discrimination and proportionality.
The United States is not a signatory to the Protocol, but recognizes the prin-
ciples pertaining to noncombatants as binding customary international law.2
The bombing campaign during the Gulf War suggested that direct tar-
geting of civilians was being replaced by singling out of so-called "dual-use"
facilities, which created conditions of hardship and deprivation for noncom-
batants.725 This campaign also raised the issues of Iraq's responsibility for al-
legedly situating military targets amidst civilian populations and objects and
the appropriate response of the United States. 6
The Kosovo campaign epitomized the new technologically sophisticated
form of aerial warfare, which purportedly involves fewer bombs with re-
duced civilian casualties and collateral damage. 7  Critics contended the
United States utilized this technological capacity to intentionally and wan-
tonly target civilians. 8 The committee appointed by the ICTY, however, de-
termined that civilians were injured or killed as a result of unavoidable and
undetectable errors and intelligence failures.2
The Afghan air campaign typified the new "virtual war" ' ° in which
technologically sophisticated, high altitude aerial bombardments are em-
718. See supra notes 214-25 and accompanying texts.
719. See supra notes 228-300 and accompanying texts.
720. See Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the
Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 717 (1997).
721. See supra notes 301-27 and accompanying texts.
722. See supra notes 329-58 and accompanying texts.
723. See supra notes 359-60 and accompanying texts.
724. See supra notes 361-410 and accompanying texts.
725. See supra notes 427-51 and accompanying texts.
726. See supra notes 473-80 and accompanying texts.
727. See supra notes 518-22 and accompanying texts.
728. See supra notes 526-49 and accompanying texts.
729. See supra notes 555-96 and accompanying texts.
730. See supra notes 608-13 and accompanying texts.
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ployed against even the most limited targets in an effort to avoid combat
casualties."' This resulted in a heavy reliance on aerial electronic surveil-
lance and intelligence operatives, some of whom proved unreliable and con-
tributed to the faulty targeting that killed or injured civilians.732
A review of aerial bombardment in the twentieth century suggests the
contemporary terrorist assault on civilians should be seen as an extension of
the lack of regard and respect for noncombatants in contemporary warfare.
Civilian injuries and deaths are the inevitable outcome of high-altitude
bombing strategies and increasingly are excused or dismissed as mistakes or
errors. Decision-makers thus are not required to justify whether the resulting
civilian fatalities are disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage.
These injuries and deaths, instead, are excused as unanticipated and un-
avoidable rather than as the result of a rational calculus.733 Collateral damage
against civilians has come to be accepted as part of the price of armed con-
flict."" This perspective suggests there must be an international initiative to
draft and disseminate a set of strict standards governing air warfare and to
hold individuals personally accountable. Such an effort would enhance the
credibility of those who justifiably castigate and condemn terrorist violence
against civilians.733
731. See supra notes 614-29 and accompanying texts.
732. See supra notes 641-79 and accompanying texts.
733. See supra notes 630-31 and accompanying texts.
734. See supra notes 692-97 and accompanying texts.
735. See CARR, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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